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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine yourself in the shoes of Marcos Poventud.  You have spent 
the last nine years in prison because of a conviction tainted by the 
police department’s failure to turn over potentially exculpatory 
evidence.1  During those nine years, you were abused, physically and 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Poventud v. City of New York, 715 F.3d 57, 58–59 (2d Cir. 2013), vacated en 
banc on other grounds, 750 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2014) [hereinafter Poventud II].   
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mentally.2  Now, although your conviction was vacated, the 
prosecution successfully argued that you should remain incarcerated 
pending your new trial.3  The prosecution is also appealing the 
vacatur, and who knows when or how the appeals process will end.4  
Remaining in prison for the foreseeable future seems inevitable.  But, 
you see a light at the end of the tunnel.  The prosecution has offered 
you a plea.5  Agreeing to it will require that you admit to being 
involved in the armed robbery, a crime against which you asserted 
your innocence at trial, but it will also secure your immediate release.6  
The choice before you seems simple, right? 
Surely this is what Marcos Poventud was thinking when he 
accepted the prosecution’s plea offer.  What likely had not crossed his 
mind, however, was the impact of the plea on his ability to seek 
damages for a violation of his constitutional rights under Brady v. 
Maryland.7  At its core, the problem with Poventud’s suit for damages 
arose from the oft-debated intersection of the two most common 
sources of federal prisoners’ rights litigation, habeas corpus and 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (§ 1983).8  Supreme Court precedent prevents a 
party from asserting a § 1983 claim when success on that claim 
necessarily implies the invalidity of an outstanding conviction.9  That 
type of challenge is more properly considered a collateral attack 
traditionally reserved for a habeas corpus petition.  In Heck v. 
Humphrey10 and Spencer v. Kemna,11 the Supreme Court grappled 
with this overlap, but concurrences and dicta-parsing split the lower 
courts as to whether Heck always required the current or former 
prisoner to show a favorable-termination when seeking damages 
under § 1983, or whether courts could recognize exceptions to Heck’s 
rule in certain circumstances that were not explicitly considered by 
                                                                                                                 
 2. See id. at 59. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See id. 
 5. See id. 
 6. See id. 
 7. 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (requiring that the prosecution disclose material 
exculpatory evidence to the defense). 
 8. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).  During the period from March 2012 to March 2013, 
19,235 habeas petitions and 17,057 prisoner civil rights actions were filed. See Cases 
Commenced, by Basis of Jurisdiction and Nature of Suit, U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloa
dStatistics/2013/tables/C02Mar13.pdf. 
 9.  See generally Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). 
 10. Id. 
 11. 523 U.S. 1 (1998). 
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the Court.12  Poventud had secured a vacatur of one conviction, only 
to subsequently plead guilty to the same facts and circumstances, 
albeit to a lesser-charged offense.  He was no longer in custody, so 
habeas relief was no longer available.  Did his desire to achieve 
freedom from a corrupted conviction cost him his opportunity to 
receive damages for a constitutional violation? 
This was the question before the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit.  The facts, circumstances, and questions of law 
are nothing short of rare and exceptional; indeed, they are 
reminiscent of those often found in first-year law school exams.  But 
the real-world implications concern an issue of profound importance: 
the right to redress for a constitutional violation.  Despite the obvious 
significance of this issue, the circuit courts are split on whether there 
are any exceptions to Heck’s seemingly absolute favorable-
termination requirement.  Initially, a sharply divided three-judge 
panel recognized the most expansive exception to Heck to date: an 
absolute right to file suit under § 1983 if a person is no longer in 
custody and therefore has no remedy in habeas.13  This decision 
launched a rehearing en banc, a procedure in the Second Circuit that 
is as rare and exceptional as the case itself.14  Ultimately, the en banc 
court decided the case on a narrower ground, finding that Marcos 
Poventud’s § 1983 suit did not, in fact, imply the invalidity of his 
conviction by guilty plea, thus removing the case from Heck’s 
purview.15  But the court never reached the soundness of the original 
panel’s analysis of Second Circuit case law.16  It remains unclear in the 
Second Circuit whether a plaintiff’s custodial status affects his ability 
to seek damages for constitutional violations and, if so, to what 
extent. 
                                                                                                                 
 12. See discussion infra Parts I.B, II.A–B. 
 13. Poventud II, 715 F.3d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 2013), vacated en banc on other grounds, 
750 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 14. It is the “longstanding tradition” of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit to defer generally to panel decisions, proceeding to a full 
rehearing en banc “only in rare and exceptional circumstances.” See Ricci v. 
DeStefano, 530 F.3d 88, 89–90 (2d Cir. 2008) (Katzmann, J., concurring in denial of 
rehearing en banc).  This tradition is rooted in the belief that “[d]ifficult issues should 
be decided only when they must be decided,” and further consideration is best left to 
the auspices of the Supreme Court. Id. at 89 (Calabresi, J., concurring in denial of 
rehearing en banc); see also id. at 93 (Jacobs, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing 
en banc). 
 15. Poventud v. City of New York, 750 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2014) [hereinafter 
Poventud III]. 
 16. See id. at 125 n.1. 
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Part I of this Article reviews the historical scope and function of 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in prisoners’ civil rights litigation.  
Part I additionally describes the manner in which the Supreme Court 
in Heck and Spencer refined that relationship to alleviate issues of 
potentially overlapping jurisdiction.  Part II explores the split 
between those circuits holding that Heck’s bar applies if success on a 
§ 1983 claim for civil damages would necessarily imply the invalidity 
of an outstanding conviction regardless of whether the claimant is still 
in custody, and those that have circumscribed Heck’s holding in favor 
of Justice Souter’s narrower view in Spencer.17  Part II further 
examines the Heck bar as applied in the Second Circuit prior to 
Poventud.  Part III analyzes the Second Circuit’s most recent 
application of Heck in both the original panel and subsequent en banc 
decisions in Poventud.18  Part IV considers the state of § 1983, Heck, 
and custody in the Second Circuit in the aftermath of Poventud.  
Bringing this analysis to bear on Poventud II’s holding reveals that 
the decision was an incorrect application of already flawed circuit law.  
However, this Part proposes that post-Heck Second Circuit case law 
can be read to permit limited exceptions to the favorable-termination 
requirement without running afoul of Heck’s core concerns.   
I.  BACKGROUND: THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AND SUPREME 
COURT JURISPRUDENCE 
Before one can understand the Supreme Court’s attempt to avoid 
collisions at “the intersection of the two most fertile sources of 
federal-court prisoner litigation,”19 it is critical to examine both 
statutes and the intended function and scope of each.  Following a 
brief discussion of § 1983 and habeas, this Part discusses the Supreme 
Court’s holdings in Heck and Spencer, paying particular attention to 
the interplay between the majority in Heck and Justice Souter’s 
concurring opinion in Spencer. 
                                                                                                                 
 17. The First, Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits have held that Heck imposes an 
absolute bar on § 1983 claims seeking civil damages where success on that claim 
would necessarily impugn a conviction for which the claimant has not already secured 
a favorable termination. See infra Part II.A.  By contrast, the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, 
Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have permitted such actions in limited 
circumstances when the claimant is no longer in custody and therefore has no 
recourse in habeas. See infra Part II.B.  As discussed in Part II.C, infra, the Second 
Circuit’s position is unclear. 
 18. Poventud II, 715 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 2013), vacated en banc on other grounds; 
Poventud III, 750 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 19. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480 (1994) (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
and 28 U.S.C. § 2254). 
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A. Section 1983 and Habeas 
1. Section 1983 
The Civil Rights Act of 1871, commonly referred to as the Ku Klux 
Klan Act, codifed at 42 U.S.C. § 1983, created a cause of action 
against those who, acting under color of state law, deprived citizens of 
their rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.20  It 
reads in relevant part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of 
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress . . . .21 
The Reconstruction-era statute’s “historical catalyst” was the 
widespread “campaign of violence and deception in the South, 
fomented by the Ku Klux Klan, which was denying decent citizens 
their civil and political rights.”22  To that end, § 1983’s purpose was 
“to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as 
guardians of the people’s federal rights.”23  To ensure those 
disenfranchised by the States could seek redress, Congress broadly 
“thr[ew] open the doors of the United States courts to individuals 
who . . . had suffered[] the deprivation of constitutional rights.”24 
Although § 1983 evinces Congress’s intent to provide broad access 
to federal courts to those seeking recompense for constitutional 
violations, such access is not exclusive; rather, it is entrusted 
concurrently with state courts.25  That is, while a suit alleging 
constitutional violations may be brought in state court, exhaustion of 
state remedies is not a prerequisite to filing suit in federal court.26 
                                                                                                                 
 20. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); see also Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 
(1972); Bracey v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Bridgeport, 368 F.3d 108, 115 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 21. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 22. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985). 
 23. Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 735 (2009) (quoting Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 
242 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 24. Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of St. of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 504 (1982) (alteration in 
original) (quoting the remarks of Congressman Lowe). 
 25. Haywood, 556 U.S. at 735 (“[S]tate courts as well as federal courts are 
entrusted with providing a forum for the vindication of federal rights violated by state 
or local officials acting under color of state law.”). 
 26. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 507. 
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2. Habeas 
A writ of habeas corpus is a writ “employed to bring a person 
before a court, most frequently to ensure that the party’s 
imprisonment or detention is not illegal.”27  Federal habeas relief may 
be sought by a state prisoner through 28 U.S.C. § 2254, where the 
petitioner claims that his or her imprisonment violates the 
Constitution or federal law.28  Unlike under § 1983, under § 2254 state 
prisoners must exhaust state remedies before properly seeking federal 
habeas relief.29  Moreover, the writ is generally available only to those 
“in custody.”30  Habeas petitions filed while the petitioner was in 
custody are usually dismissed as moot once the prisoner is released, a 
result that potentially forecloses any means of collateral attack on the 
conviction.31 
3. Collisions at the Intersection 
Each statute permits a claimant to seek redress for a state actor’s 
violation of federally protected rights.  This overlap has raised 
concerns that “the no-exhaustion rule of § 1983 might, in the absence 
of some limitation, devour the exhaustion rule of the habeas corpus 
statute.”32  Without a limitation, for example, a prisoner could file suit 
under § 1983, even though success in that suit would necessarily imply 
that the underlying conviction is invalid, which in turn would require 
that the claimant be released (a function primarily reserved for 
habeas).  Moreover, that claimant would be free from the exhaustion 
requirements mandated under habeas.  In Preiser v. Rodriguez, the 
Supreme Court held that, although certain claims may fit within the 
literal terms of § 1983’s broad language, Congress specifically 
determined that habeas corpus’s strong policy of avoiding 
unnecessary friction between the federal and state court systems 
mandates that habeas corpus be the exclusive remedy for state 
prisoners attacking the validity of the fact or length of their 
                                                                                                                 
 27. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 728 (8th ed. 2004). 
 28. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2012). 
 29. Id. § 2254(b)(1)(A). 
 30. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2012); see also infra note 65 and accompanying cases. 
 31. See infra Part II.A.4. 
 32. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 503–04 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(“Indeed, every application by a state prisoner for federal habeas corpus relief 
against his jailers could, as a matter of logic and semantics, be viewed as an action 
under the Ku Klux Klan Act to obtain injunctive relief against ‘the deprivation,’ by 
one acting under color of state law, ‘of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured 
by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.”). 
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confinement.33  However, that decision left open the question of 
whether claims that ordinarily sound in habeas, because they 
challenge the validity of an outstanding conviction, may properly be 
brought under § 1983 if habeas is no longer available.  As discussed 
below, the dueling dicta in Heck and Spencer left the answer unclear. 
B. Heck and Spencer 
1. Heck v. Humphrey 
Roy Heck was convicted in an Indiana state court of voluntary 
manslaughter for killing his wife.34  Sentenced to fifteen years in 
prison, Heck filed a § 1983 suit in the Southern District of Indiana 
alleging that state police officers and prosecutors had “engaged in an 
‘unlawful, unreasonable, and arbitrary investigation’ leading to 
[Heck’s] arrest; ‘knowingly destroyed’ evidence ‘which was 
exculpatory in nature and could have proved [Heck’s] innocence’; and 
caused ‘an illegal and unlawful voice identification procedure’ to be 
used at [his] trial.”35  Although these claims may properly have been 
brought in a habeas petition seeking release from custody, Heck 
sought only damages.36  The district court dismissed the suit because 
success on the alleged claims would have challenged the legality of 
Heck’s outstanding conviction,37 and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.38  
Writing for the panel, Judge Posner concluded that: 
If regardless of the relief sought, a [§ 1983] plaintiff is challenging 
the legality of his conviction, so that if he won his case the state 
would be obligated to release him even if he hadn’t sought that 
relief, the suit is classified as an application for habeas corpus and 
the plaintiff must exhaust state remedies, on pain of dismissal if he 
fails to do so.39 
The Supreme Court thus was presented with the question of 
whether § 1983’s broad scope reached damages claims that, if 
successful, could affect a collateral attack on an outstanding criminal 
conviction.  The Court answered in the negative and affirmed the 
                                                                                                                 
 33. See id. at 489–90. 
 34. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 478 (1994). 
 35. Id. at 479. 
 36. At the time Heck filed his § 1983 claim, a habeas petition would have been 
deemed unexhausted because his direct appeal of the conviction was still pending.  
See Heck v. Humphrey, 997 F.2d 355, 357 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 37. Heck, 512 U.S. at 479. 
 38. Heck, 997 F.2d at 359. 
 39. Id. at 357. 
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Seventh Circuit.40  Although the Court in Preiser v. Rodriguez41 had 
suggested, in dicta, that a prisoner seeking only damages rather than 
challenging the fact or length of confinement may be able to seek 
relief under § 1983, Justice Scalia clarified that the Court’s decision in 
Preiser was not rooted in the particular relief sought, but rather in the 
nature of the claim.42  Addressing the Preiser dicta directly, Justice 
Scalia explained, “[the] statement [that a suit for damages under 
§ 1983 is proper] may not be true, however, when establishing the 
basis for the damages claim necessarily demonstrates the invalidity of 
the conviction.  In that situation, the claimant can be said to be 
‘attacking . . . the fact or length of . . . confinement.’”43  Thus, because 
the end result of a successful suit by Heck would result in the very 
relief prohibited by Preiser, it was barred under § 1983. 
The Court analogized Heck’s claims to the common law tort of 
malicious prosecution.  To succeed on a claim of malicious 
prosecution, a plaintiff must show a favorable termination of the 
underlying conviction.44  This requirement, explained Justice Scalia, is 
grounded in “the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not 
appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding 
criminal judgments.”45  Accordingly, extending this principle to 
Heck’s claim “avoids parallel litigation . . . and it precludes the 
possibility of the claimant succeeding in the tort action after having 
been convicted in the underlying criminal prosecution.”46  This result 
is consistent with the “strong judicial policy against the creation of 
two conflicting resolutions arising out of the same or identical 
transaction.”47  The Supreme Court set forth the governing standard 
as follows: 
We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly 
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm 
caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or 
sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or 
sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive 
order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Heck, 512 U.S. at 490. 
 41. 411 U.S. 475 (1973). 
 42. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 481–82. 
 43. Id. at 481–82 (alterations in original) (quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 490). 
 44. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 
119, at 874 (5th ed. 1984). 
 45. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486. 
 46. Id. at 484 (quoting 8 S. SPEISER ET AL., AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 28:5, at 24 
(1991)). 
 47. Id. 
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determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance 
of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  A claim for damages 
bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not 
been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.48 
As a threshold matter, therefore, district courts must determine 
whether a prisoner’s § 1983 claim implies the invalidity of an 
outstanding conviction.49  If so, the suit is not cognizable under § 1983, 
and the prisoner’s remedy is properly sought in habeas.50  Because 
Heck failed to secure a favorable termination of the conviction upon 
which his damages claims rested, his § 1983 claims could not lie.51 
While it was clear that the plaintiff need not show a favorable 
termination when success on a § 1983 claim bears no relationship to 
the validity of an outstanding conviction,52 the Court divided on the 
applicability of the favorable-termination requirement when, by 
virtue of the prisoner’s release from custody, habeas is not a viable 
option.  That is, is a showing of favorable termination required when 
success on a § 1983 claim challenges the validity of an outstanding 
conviction but the claimant has no access to habeas?  In a concurring 
opinion, Justice Souter, joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and 
O’Connor, argued for a narrower holding, applying the favorable-
termination requirement only to § 1983 claims brought by claimants 
who still had access to habeas relief.53  Applying the rule beyond that, 
Justice Souter explained, “would needlessly place at risk the rights of 
those outside the intersection of § 1983 and the habeas statute, 
individuals not ‘in custody’ for habeas purposes.”54  The concurring 
Justices believed that transposing a favorable-termination 
requirement on § 1983 claims brought by prisoners (both current and 
former) contravened the purpose behind § 1983,55 and that the 
majority’s common law analysis was best limited to actions where 
§ 1983 and habeas overlap.56 
                                                                                                                 
 48. Id. at 486–87 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). 
 49. See id. at 487. 
 50. See id. at 489 (“We do not engraft an exhaustion requirement upon § 1983, 
but rather deny the existence of a cause of action.”); see also Martin A. Schwartz, 
The Supreme Court’s Unfortunate Narrowing of the Section 1983 Remedy for Brady 
Violations, CHAMPION, May 2013, at 58, 59. 
 51. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 489. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 500 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 501–02. 
 56. See id. at 497–98. 
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The majority rejected Justice Souter’s concerns, responding that 
“the principle barring collateral attacks—a longstanding and deeply 
rooted feature of both the common law and our own jurisprudence—
is not rendered inapplicable by the fortuity that a convicted criminal 
is no longer incarcerated.”57  However, because the Court’s holding in 
Heck did not turn on whether Heck was in custody (and therefore 
whether he had access to habeas), it remained unclear how far the 
Heck bar extended.58 
2. Spencer v. Kemna 
In Spencer v. Kemna,59 Randy Spencer filed a habeas petition 
challenging a decision by the Missouri Board of Probation and Parole 
to revoke his parole.60  Before a decision on Spencer’s petition was 
issued, his prison term expired and he was released.61  Because 
Spencer was no longer in custody, the district court dismissed his 
petition as moot.62  Spencer argued on appeal that if his habeas 
petition was deemed moot, he would have no federal remedy because 
under Heck he would likewise be barred from bringing an action 
under § 1983.63  Again writing for the majority, Justice Scalia rejected 
Spencer’s assertion as “a great non sequitur,” because the Court, 
reemphasizing its holding in Heck, does not believe that “a § 1983 
action for damages must always and everywhere be available.”64  In 
any event, because Spencer chose not to file his claims under § 1983, 
the Court did not find occasion to reach the question posited by 
Justice Souter’s concurring opinion in Heck.  Rather, because 
Spencer could not show collateral consequences flowing from his 
outstanding conviction,65 his claim was not cognizable on federal 
habeas review and the rulings of the lower courts were affirmed.66 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Id. at 490 n.10 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
 58. See Jason A. Jones, Note, Prisoner Litigation and the Mistake of Jenkins v. 
Haubert, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 140, 145–48, 160–61 (2000); Thomas Stephen 
Schneidau, Note, Favorable Termination After Freedom: Why Heck’s Rule Should 
Reign, Within Reason, 70 LA. L. REV. 647, 655–58 (2010). 
 59. 523 U.S. 1 (1998). 
 60. Id. at 3. 
 61. See id. at 6. 
 62. Id. (dismissing the petition “[b]ecause . . . the sentences at issue here have 
expired, petitioner is no longer in custody within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), 
and his claim for habeas corpus relief is moot” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 63. See id. at 17.  Spencer’s conviction, after all, remained outstanding, but his 
release from custody precluded him from seeking relief through habeas. Id. 
 64. See id. 
 65. In January 2013, the Supreme Court clearly stated that “federal habeas 
petitioners, by definition, are incarcerated, not on probation.” Ryan v. Gonzales, 133 
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Justice Souter concurred to correct Spencer’s flawed assumption 
that if habeas relief were not available to him, a claim under § 1983 
would likewise be barred under Heck for failure to prove a favorable 
termination: 
[Spencer] assumes that Heck . . . held or entails that conclusion . . . .  
If Spencer were right on this point, his argument would provide a 
reason, whether or not dispositive, to recognize continuing standing 
to litigate his habeas claim.  But he is wrong; Heck did not hold that 
a released prisoner in Spencer’s circumstances is out of court on a 
§ 1983 claim, and for reasons explained in my Heck concurrence, it 
would be unsound to read either Heck or the habeas statute as 
requiring any such result.67 
Justice Souter suggested a “better view,” where “a former prisoner, 
no longer ‘in custody,’ may bring a § 1983 action establishing the 
unconstitutionality of a conviction or confinement without being 
bound to satisfy a favorable-termination requirement that it would be 
impossible as a matter of law for him to satisfy.”68  Such a position is a 
“simple way to avoid collisions at the intersection of habeas and 
§ 1983” and does require engrafting a new (and often difficult to 
prove) element into a method of relief intended to operate broadly.69 
Here, like in Heck, the Court did not hold expressly that those no 
longer in custody and without recourse through habeas must still 
satisfy a favorable-termination requirement to proceed under 
§ 1983.70  Spencer’s significance, however, is derived from the fact that 
                                                                                                                 
S. Ct. 696, 707 (2013).  Other courts have suggested, however, that there are certain 
circumstances under which an individual, even though released on probation, may be 
eligible for federal habeas relief because the conditions of parole are so restrictive as 
to amount to a restraint of liberty. See, e.g., Burd v. Sessler, 702 F.3d 429, 435 (7th 
Cir. 2012); Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 894 (2d Cir. 
1996). 
 66. See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 18. 
 67. Id. at 19 (Souter, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted).  Justice Souter 
conceded, however, that: 
[T]he majority opinion in Heck can be read to suggest that this favorable-
termination requirement is an element of any § 1983 action alleging 
unconstitutional conviction, whether or not leading to confinement and 
whether or not any confinement continued when the § 1983 action was 
filed.  Indeed, although Heck did not present such facts, the majority 
acknowledged the possibility that even a released prisoner might not be 
permitted to bring a § 1983 action implying the invalidity of a conviction or 
confinement without first satisfying the favorable-termination requirement.  
Id. at 19–20. 
 68. Id. at 21. 
 69. Id. at 20. 
 70. See id. at 17 (majority opinion) (“It is not certain, in any event, that 
a § 1983 damages claim would be foreclosed.  If, for example, petitioner were to seek 
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four Justices agreed with Justice Souter’s conception of the 
relationship between habeas and § 1983.71  Justices O’Connor, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer joined in Justice Souter’s concurrence.72  Justice 
Ginsburg, a member of the Heck majority, concurred separately to 
express her agreement with Justice Souter’s limited reading of Heck: 
“I have come to agree with Justice Souter’s reasoning: Individuals 
without recourse to the habeas statute because they are not ‘in 
custody’ . . . fit within § 1983’s ‘broad reach.’”73  Likewise, Justice 
Stevens endorsed this view in his dissent.74  Thus, five Justices, 
although not in any one majority opinion, supported the proposition 
that a prisoner no longer in custody need not satisfy a favorable 
termination requirement to bring an action under § 1983, even if 
success in that action necessarily implies the invalidity of an 
outstanding conviction.75  This left the federal circuit courts to 
extrapolate and apply the true “majority” position.  The result, 
predictably, was a circuit split. 
II.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER CUSTODY AND HECK’S 
FAVORABLE-TERMINATION REQUIREMENT 
Part II of this Article details the differing approaches taken by the 
United States Courts of Appeals in determining whether an ex-
prisoner’s suit for damages may proceed.  The circuit courts have 
reached conflicting conclusions over whether Heck’s bar is 
unqualified, preventing suits by those who have no remedy in habeas.  
In particular, four circuits have refused to find any exceptions to 
Heck’s bar, while seven rely on Justice Souter’s concurrences to 
                                                                                                                 
damages ‘for using the wrong procedures, not for reaching the wrong result,’ and if 
that procedural defect did not ‘necessarily imply the invalidity of’ the revocation, 
then Heck would have no application all.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 71. For a discussion of the weight to be accorded Justice Souter’s Spencer 
principle versus footnote 10 in Heck, see Bruce Ellis Fein, Heck v. Humphrey After 
Spencer v. Kemna, 28 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 1, 23–25 (2002). 
 72. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 18 (Souter, J., concurring).  Justice Breyer replaced 
Justice Blackmun, who joined Justice Souter’s concurrence in Heck, on the Court.  
Justice Stevens, who also joined Justice Souter’s Heck concurrence, adopted the 
position in a separate dissent. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 22 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
 73. Id. at 21 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 74. Id. at 25 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Given the Court’s holding that 
petitioner does not have a remedy under the habeas statute, it is perfectly clear, as 
Justice Souter explains, that he may bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”). 
 75. See, e.g., Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 752 n.2 (2004) (per curiam) 
(“Members of the Court have expressed the view that unavailability of habeas for 
other reasons may also dispense with the Heck requirement.  This case is no occasion 
to settle the issue.” (citations omitted)). 
464 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLII 
support limited exceptions requiring good faith and practicality.  This 
Part examines the varied approaches to answering this question. 
A. Circuit Courts Finding that Custody Is Irrelevant Under 
Heck’s Binding Precedent 
Four circuit courts have held that Heck’s bar to § 1983 suits that 
imply the invalidity of an extant conviction is absolute and remains 
unaffected by the Spencer concurrence and dissent. 
1. The First Circuit 
Five months after Spencer, in Figueroa v. Rivera,76 the First Circuit 
became the first U.S. appeals court to grapple with the application of 
Heck’s favorable-termination requirement to a prisoner without a 
habeas remedy.  In Figueroa, the plaintiffs sued on behalf of a relative 
who died in prison while his state habeas petition was “languish[ing]” 
in court.77  Because of the prisoner’s death, the district court dismissed 
his habeas petition as moot.78  The § 1983 suit alleged constitutional 
violations against members of law enforcement who had allegedly 
framed and prosecuted the prisoner for the crime for which he was 
incarcerated at the time of his death.79  The district court dismissed 
the action for failure to state a claim, invoking Heck’s explanation 
that the Court’s holding “do[es] not engraft an exhaustion 
requirement upon § 1983, but rather den[ies] the existence of a cause 
of action.”80 
The First Circuit upheld the district court’s decision.  Although 
plaintiff’s claim of “fundamental unfairness” struck “a responsive 
chord,” the court nevertheless held that Heck barred the claim: 
“Here, the appellants do not allege that an authorized tribunal or 
executive body overturned or otherwise invalidated [the decedent’s] 
conviction.  Consequently, Heck bars the unconstitutional conviction 
and imprisonment claims.”81  Heck left no room for equitable 
exceptions and absent a clearer directive from the Supreme Court, 
the First Circuit declined to find one. 
In a footnote, the First Circuit discussed and rejected the notion 
that the concurring and dissenting opinions in Heck and Spencer can 
                                                                                                                 
 76. 147 F.3d 77 (1st Cir. 1998). 
 77. See id. at 79. 
 78. See id. at 79–80. 
 79. See id. at 80. 
 80. See id.; see also Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489 (1994). 
 81. Figueroa, 147 F.3d at 80-81. 
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be read to provide an exception to Heck’s otherwise sweeping 
favorable-termination requirement: 
We are mindful that dicta from concurring and dissenting opinions 
in a recently decided case may cast doubt upon the universality of 
Heck’s “favorable termination” requirement.  The Court, however, 
has admonished the lower federal courts to follow its directly 
applicable precedent, even if that precedent appears weakened by 
pronouncements in its subsequent decisions, and to leave to the 
Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.  We obey this 
admonition.82 
Fifteen years later, Figueroa remains good law in the First Circuit.83 
2. The Fifth Circuit 
In Randell v. Johnson,84 the Fifth Circuit addressed a § 1983 claim 
by an ex-inmate seeking damages for an allegedly improper sentence 
calculation.85  Police arrested Randell and charged him with driving 
while intoxicated.86  Randell alleged that he was incarcerated from 
September 1996 to June 1997 because of a warrant from the Texas 
Board of Pardons and Paroles.87  Randell alleged that he was not 
given credit for this time and consequently had to serve that time over 
again.88  When Randell filed his § 1983 suit, he was no longer in 
custody and therefore could not file a habeas petition.89  He sought 
compensatory damages of $1000 per day for each day doubly-served.90  
The district court dismissed the suit as frivolous.91 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed on the grounds that Randell’s suit failed 
to state a claim.92  Like the plaintiffs in Figueroa, Randell argued that 
he need not meet Heck’s favorable-termination requirement because 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Id. at 81 n.3 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 83. See, e.g., Traudt v. Roberts, No. 10-CV-12-JL, 2013 WL 3754862, at *6–7 
(D.N.H. July 15, 2013) (“This court, of course, is bound to follow directly applicable 
precedent from the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.  That 
precedent, Figueroa, expressly rejects the notion that—notwithstanding the 
concurring opinion in Spencer—Heck does not apply when the plaintiff can no longer 
obtain habeas relief from the conviction that his § 1983 suit calls into question.”). 
 84. 227 F.3d 300 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). 
 85. See id. at 300–01. 
 86. Id. at 300. 
 87. See id. 
 88. See id. 
 89. See id. at 301. 
 90. Id. at 300–01. 
 91. Id. at 300. 
 92. Id. at 301. 
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he was ineligible for federal habeas relief.93  The Fifth Circuit rejected 
Randell’s assertion, finding that Heck unequivocally requires a 
plaintiff seeking damages in a § 1983 suit to first demonstrate a 
favorable termination.94 
Consistent with the Figueroa court’s approach, the Fifth Circuit 
rejected the argument that Justice Souter’s concurrences changed the 
post-Heck legal landscape: “[W]e decline to announce for the 
Supreme Court that it has overruled one of its decisions [and we] 
agree with the First Circuit.”95 
3. The Third Circuit 
In Gilles v. Davis,96 decided in 2005, the Third Circuit expanded 
Heck’s bar against § 1983 claims to guilty pleas and entry into an 
“Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition” (ARD) program.97  
University police charged plaintiff Timothy Petit with “resisting 
arrest, disorderly conduct, and failure of disorderly persons to 
disperse.”98  Released from custody that same day, Petit entered into 
the ARD program that “permits expungement of the criminal record 
upon successful completion of a probationary term.”99  Petit 
successfully completed the program,100 and then filed a § 1983 
complaint seeking damages for multiple alleged First Amendment 
violations.101 
The district court dismissed Petit’s claims as barred by Heck.102  
Despite Petit’s successful completion of the ARD program, the 
district court found that under Heck, expungement under an ARD 
                                                                                                                 
 93. See id. 
 94. See id. 
 95. See id.; see, e.g., Thomas v. Louisiana Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 406 F. App’x 890, 
898 n.5 (5th Cir. 2010) (“In Randell, we noted that several other circuits do not 
apply Heck’s favorable termination rule when the plaintiff is no longer in custody.  
The Supreme Court has suggested that this issue is unsettled.  Regardless of this 
uncertainty, Randell remains good law in this circuit, and we share its reluctance 
to ‘announce for the Supreme Court that it has overruled one of its decisions.’” 
(citations omitted)); Walker v. LeBlanc, No. 12-CV-1950, 2012 WL 6962108, at *1 
(W.D. La. Nov. 28, 2012). 
 96. 427 F.3d 197 (3rd Cir. 2005). 
 97. See id. at 201. 
 98. Id. at 202. 
 99. See id. 
 100. Id. at 209. 
 101. See id. at 203. 
 102. Id. at 208. 
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program is not a favorable termination of the conviction.103  The Third 
Circuit agreed and affirmed the dismissal. 
The court reasoned that the principle in favor of avoiding parallel 
litigation that could result in conflicting adjudications was equally 
applicable in the ARD context because acceptance into the ARD 
program “may be construed as a conviction for purposes of 
computing sentences on subsequent convictions,” and “[b]y entering 
the ARD program, the defendant waives his right to prove his 
innocence”:104 
Petit’s underlying disorderly conduct charge and his § 1983 First 
Amendment claim require answering the same question—whether 
Petit’s behavior constituted protected activity or disorderly conduct.  
If ARD does not constitute a favorable termination, success in the 
§ 1983 claim would result in parallel litigation over whether Petit’s 
activity constituted disorderly conduct and could result in a 
conflicting resolution arising from the same conduct.105 
Recognizing that some courts had questioned Heck’s continued 
validity in light of the Spencer concurrences and dissent, the Third 
Circuit joined the First and Fifth Circuits in rejecting that 
contention.106 
4. The Eighth Circuit 
In Entzi v. Redmann,107 the Eighth Circuit in 2007 became the 
fourth federal appeals court to hold that Heck’s favorable-
termination requirement was not subject to exceptions.  In Entzi, the 
plaintiff filed a § 1983 suit to recover damages for the loss of 
performance-based sentence-reduction credits that allegedly 
extended the term of his sentence by more than a year.108  The district 
court dismissed Entzi’s civil rights suit on the pleadings, and the 
Eighth Circuit affirmed.109 
                                                                                                                 
 103. See id. at 209. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See id. at 209–10 (adhering to “the Supreme Court’s admonition to lower 
federal courts to follow its directly applicable precedent, even if that precedent 
appears weakened by pronouncements in its subsequent decisions, and to leave to the 
Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions” (internal quotations omitted)).  
Gilles remains good law in the Third Circuit. See, e.g., Ashton v. City of Uniontown, 
459 F. App’x 185, 187–88 (3d Cir. 2012); Robinson v. N.J. State Police, No. 11-6070, 
2012 WL 5944381, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 27, 2012). 
 107. 485 F.3d 998 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 108. See id. at 1003. 
 109. Id. at 1000. 
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The Eighth Circuit found that a person challenging the duration of 
imprisonment or the loss of sentence-reduction credits must do so by 
seeking a writ of habeas corpus.110  Habeas corpus was no longer 
available to Entzi because it was both untimely and mooted by his 
release from prison.111  Entzi, like the plaintiffs in Figueroa, Randell, 
and Gilles, argued that this removed his case from Heck’s grasp.112  
The court recognized no such exception: 
Entzi relies on a later decision of the Supreme Court, in which a 
combination of five concurring and dissenting Justices agreed in 
dicta that “a former prisoner, no longer ‘in custody,’ may bring a 
§ 1983 action establishing the unconstitutionality of a conviction or 
confinement without being bound to satisfy a favorable-termination 
requirement that it would be impossible as a matter of law for him to 
satisfy.”  Absent a decision of the Court that explicitly overrules 
what we understand to be the holding of Heck, however, we decline 
to depart from that rule.113 
In sum, these Circuits recognized the potential for unfairness 
inherent in such a strict application of Heck’s bar, but their decisions 
reflect an unwillingness to carve out any exceptions that, in their view, 
would impermissibly deviate from Supreme Court precedent.  Having 
“definitively decided, in the negative, the question of whether a 
prisoner who is precluded from pursuing habeas relief can file a 
§ 1983 action” that challenges the validity of an outstanding 
conviction,114 the prerogative to alter that holding rests solely with the 
Supreme Court. 
                                                                                                                 
 110. See id. at 1003. 
 111. See id. at 1000, 1003. 
 112. See id. at 1003. 
 113. Id. (internal citations omitted).  Courts in the Eight Circuit continue to apply 
Entzi’s interpretation of Heck. See, e.g., Marlowe v. Fabian, 676 F.3d 743, 746–47 
(8th Cir. 2012) (“We have recognized that this type of § 1983 plaintiff must show a 
favorable termination by state or federal authorities even when he is no longer 
incarcerated.”); Newmy v. Johnson, No. 3:13CV00132 JLH–JTR, 2013 WL 2552734, 
at *2 (E.D. Ark. June 10, 2013) (“The minority of circuits, including the Eighth 
Circuit, have held that Heck’s holding is not limited to those in custody and that 
because the statements in Spencer are dicta, those statements do not overrule Heck’s 
holding.”). 
 114. Dible v. Scholl, 410 F. Supp. 2d 807, 822 (N.D. Iowa 2006). 
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B. Circuit Courts Finding that the Spencer “Majority” Permits 
Exceptions to the Heck Bar in Limited Circumstances 
Six circuits115 have taken the position that in Spencer, five of the 
nine Justices embraced a less expansive interpretation of Heck that 
permits civil rights suits to proceed even if their success would 
necessarily imply the invalidity of an extant conviction.  These 
holdings do not stand for the proposition that some federal remedy 
must always be available.  To the contrary, these courts crafted their 
exceptions to Heck’s otherwise broad prohibition in a very limited 
fashion, usually requiring that the plaintiff never had, or never would 
have (on mootness grounds), an opportunity to petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus. 
1. The Eleventh Circuit 
The Eleventh Circuit in Harden v. Pataki116 permitted a § 1983 
claim to proceed when federal habeas relief was no longer available.  
In Harden, the court held “that a claim filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 seeking damages and declaratory relief for the violation of a 
state prisoner’s federally protected extradition rights is not 
automatically barred by Heck.”117  In 1986, while serving a twenty-five 
year sentence in Kansas, plaintiff Major Harden was extradited to 
Suffolk County, New York, where he was convicted and sentenced to 
another twenty-five year term for a separate crime.118  After release 
from confinement in 2000 on yet another crime, Harden alleged that 
he was extradited to New York to serve the sentence imposed on the 
1986 conviction without a warrant, waiver of his rights, or a habeas 
hearing.119  The district court applied Heck and dismissed the suit for 
failing to state a cognizable claim because the 1986 conviction 
remained unchallenged.120 
The Eleventh Circuit reversed.  First, the court found that the 
alleged violations of extradition procedures, namely the failure to 
procure a signed warrant or hold a habeas hearing, do not relate to 
Harden’s guilt or innocence.121  Therefore, the court reasoned, success 
                                                                                                                 
 115. This does not include the Second Circuit, which is discussed separately in Part 
II.C., infra. 
 116. 320 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 117. Id. at 1301–02. 
 118. Id. at 1292. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See id. 
 121. See id. at 1298. 
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on Harden’s claim would not conflict with his underlying 
conviction.122  Accordingly, Harden’s claim fell outside Heck’s scope. 
The court also found a “second reason” why Heck did not bar 
Harden’s suit.123  Unlike those courts discussed in Part II.A, the 
Eleventh Circuit abided by the Spencer concurring and dissenting 
opinions’ explanation that “Heck should be read as permitting a 
prisoner to bring a § 1983 action establishing the unconstitutionality 
of a conviction or confinement without being bound to satisfy a 
favorable-termination requirement that it would be impossible as a 
matter of law for him to satisfy.”124  The court found this rationale 
directly applicable to Harden because habeas relief is not available 
once a person has been extradited, even if the extradition was 
illegal.125  Applying the Spencer analysis to Harden, the court rejected 
the untenable result that “a claim for relief brought by a person 
already extradited would be placed beyond the scope of § 1983, when 
exactly the same claim could be redressed if brought by a person to 
be, but not yet, extradited.”126  To hold otherwise, the court 
concluded, would “deny any federal forum for claiming a deprivation 
of federal rights to those who cannot first obtain a favorable state 
ruling.”127 
2. The Ninth Circuit 
The following cases are illustrative of limited exceptions to Heck’s 
bar recognized by the Ninth Circuit.  In Cunningham v. Gates,128 the 
court held that Cunningham’s claims were unaffected by Heck even 
though he no longer had access to habeas.129  It was not that 
Cunningham was never or no longer incarcerated; it was simply that 
                                                                                                                 
 122. See id. 
 123. See id. 
 124. See id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 125. See id. at 1299. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See id. at 1298 (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 500 (1994) (Souter, 
J., concurring) (emphasis added)).  Within the Eleventh Circuit, however, this 
holding is read narrowly.  In Domotor v. Wennet, 630 F. Supp. 2d 1368 (S.D. Fla. 
2009), aff’d, 356 F. App’x 316 (11th Cir. 2009), the district court barred a § 1983 claim 
where the plaintiff, although now ineligible for habeas relief, had not pursued that 
means of redress when it was available. Id. at 1380.  The court found that to allow the 
plaintiff to circumvent the applicable state exhaustion requirements but permit a 
collateral attack in federal court is the exact circumstance that Heck sought to 
prevent. See id. 
 128. 312 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 129. See id. at 1153 n.3. 
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he had let the time in which to file a petition lapse.130  The court 
rejected Cunningham’s argument that Heck was inapposite under 
these circumstances, finding the argument inconsistent with the view 
taken by the concurring and dissenting Spencer Justices.131  Habeas 
relief was “impossible as a matter of law” in Cunningham’s case 
because he failed to pursue it in a timely manner, not simply because 
he was no longer incarcerated.  The court declined to permit 
Cunningham’s own (and seemingly intentional) failure to timely 
pursue a remedy under habeas to operate as a means to circumvent 
Heck’s reach.132 
However, just two weeks after the court’s decision in Cunningham, 
the Ninth Circuit in Nonnette v. Small133 permitted a § 1983 claim to 
proceed even though, like in Cunningham, the plaintiff was barred 
from seeking relief through habeas.  In Nonnette, the plaintiff, while 
incarcerated, stabbed another inmate during a prison fight.134  A 
disciplinary proceeding assessed Nonnette a 360-day loss of good-
time credits and 100 days in administrative segregation.135  Nonnette 
first exhausted his prison administrative remedies, as required by 
§ 1983, before seeking alternative forms of relief.136  The remedy for 
such “good time” deprivation is ordinarily found in a petition for writ 
of habeas corpus, but Nonnette was ineligible for habeas relief 
because he already had been released from custody.137  Under those 
circumstances, the Ninth Circuit held that Heck did not bar Nonnette 
from maintaining a § 1983 claim.138  Distinguishing the facts from 
Cunningham, the court premised its decision in Nonnette on the 
plaintiff’s timely attempt to satisfy the favorable-termination 
requirement, the failure of which was directly attributable to the 
brevity of his incarceration.139  Moreover, the court recognized that it 
                                                                                                                 
 130. See id. 
 131. See id. 
 132. See id. 
 133. 316 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 134. Id. at 874. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See id. at 874 n.2. 
 137. See id. at 875–76. 
 138. Id. at 876. 
 139. See id. at 874–77 & n.6 (emphasis added) (“The fact that Nonnette has been 
released from the incarceration that his civil suit, if successful, would impugn, and 
that a habeas petition would be moot for that reason, differentiates this case from our 
recent decision in Cunningham v. Gates, 312 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2002).  In 
Cunningham, the plaintiff brought a civil suit that would have impugned the 
conviction for which he was still incarcerated; habeas corpus was unavailable only 
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was not Nonnette’s underlying conviction that gave rise to his § 1983 
suit, but rather the procedures by which his incarceration allegedly 
was extended.  Thus, like the court in Harden, the Ninth Circuit 
found Heck not directly applicable.140 
Unlike the Eleventh Circuit in Harden, however, the Ninth Circuit 
refused to consider that the concurring and dissenting opinions in 
Spencer had affected Heck’s precedential power.141  Additionally, the 
Nonnette court “emphasize[d]” that its holding “affects only former 
prisoners challenging loss of good-time credits, revocation of parole 
or similar matters.”142  Thus, plaintiffs seeking damages for pure 
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment claims must still satisfy 
Heck’s favorable-termination requirement regardless of custodial 
status or habeas availability.143 
These cases are contrasted appropriately with the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding in Guerrero v. Gates,144 where the court held plaintiff’s § 1983 
claims of wrongful arrest, malicious prosecution, and conspiracy 
barred by Heck because, although no longer in custody, the plaintiff 
never challenged his convictions prior to his civil rights suit.145  
Nonnette, the court explained, “was founded on the unfairness of 
barring a plaintiff’s potentially legitimate constitutional claims when 
the individual immediately pursued relief after the incident giving rise 
to those claims and could not seek habeas relief only because of the 
shortness of his prison sentence.”146  The court reiterated that 
Nonnette’s reprieve from Heck was limited to challenges to prison 
administrative proceedings, not to challenges to an extant 
conviction.147 
                                                                                                                 
because he had let the time for such a petition expire.  Under those circumstances, we 
declined to take the case out of the rule of Heck.”). 
 140. See id. at 877 n.5. 
 141. See id. (“We recognize that, if Heck precluded Nonnette’s action, we would 
not be free to consider it undermined by the opinions in Spencer. The Supreme Court 
retains the sole prerogative of overruling its own decisions. We conclude that Heck 
does not control, and reach that understanding of Heck’s original meaning with the 
aid of the discussions in Spencer.”). 
 142. Id. at 877 n.7. 
 143. See id.; see also Garber v. City of Los Angeles Gen. Servs. Dep’t, 509 F. 
App’x 667, 667 (9th Cir. 2013); Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 784–85 (9th Cir. 
2012). 
 144. 442 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 145. See id. at 705. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See id.; see also Rouse v. Connor, No. 12-2121 PJH, 2012 WL 2368464, at *10 
(N.D. Cal. June 21, 2012) (challenging an underlying conviction barred under 
Nonnette); Wesbecher v. Landaker, No. CIV 01-2410, 2008 WL 2682614, at *4 (E.D. 
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3. The Sixth Circuit 
Similar to the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Nonnette, the Sixth Circuit 
in Powers v. Hamilton County Public Defender Commission148 
adopted the position that when a prisoner is precluded from seeking 
the invalidation of his conviction through habeas because of a limited 
term of incarceration, an action under § 1983 is not barred by Heck.  
In Powers, the plaintiff pled no contest to misdemeanor reckless 
driving, was sentenced to thirty days in jail, and fined $250.149  
Twenty-seven days of the sentence were suspended, but Powers failed 
to pay the fine in violation of his probation.150  He again pled no 
contest, and the original thirty-day sentence was restored and 
served.151  After his release, Powers sued the state’s public defender’s 
office for failure to seek an indigency hearing to determine his ability 
to pay the fine.152  The district court granted summary judgment in 
favor of Powers.153 
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court on two grounds.  First, 
the court held Heck inapplicable because Powers was foreclosed from 
challenging his incarceration in a habeas petition.154  The court noted 
that the dispositive factor was the length of Powers’ incarceration, not 
the fact that he was no longer incarcerated.155  Unwilling to accept 
that “Justice Souter intended to carve out a broad Heck exception for 
all former prisoners,” the Sixth Circuit read the better rule as 
precluding only those actions by former prisoners who had sufficient 
access to habeas relief but chose not to pursue it.156  The court 
rejected the reasoning of the First, Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits 
that “decreed themselves bound by Heck to the exclusion of Justice 
Souter’s comments in his Heck and Spencer concurrences.”157  
                                                                                                                 
Cal. July 1, 2008) (explaining that plaintiff’s failure to expeditiously seek habeas relief 
while in custody foreclosed his § 1983 action under Nonnette). 
 148. 501 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 149. Id. at 597. 
 150. See id. 
 151. See id. 
 152. See id. at 597–98. 
 153. See id. at 598. 
 154. See id. at 601. 
 155. See id. 
 156. See id. at 601–02. 
 157. See id. at 602.  This view has been called into question in subsequent Sixth 
Circuit opinions. See, e.g., Harrison v. Michigan, 722 F.3d 768, 773–74 & n.1 (6th Cir. 
2013) (“In the wake of Spencer, a circuit split has developed concerning the 
significance of Justice Souter’s concurring opinion, with several circuits convinced 
that it must be considered dictum because it was unnecessary to the holding of the 
case (i.e., that Spencer’s habeas claim was moot), and other circuits, including our 
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Instead, the Sixth Circuit limited Heck to its facts and followed “the 
ordinary rule refinement that appellate courts [must] necessarily 
engage in.”158  The court declined to cast aside the view of five 
Justices in Spencer that Heck’s bar is not as expansive as it seems.159  
The court also permitted Powers’ suit to proceed because the claims 
in his § 1983 action challenged the procedures by which he was 
incarcerated, and not the conviction itself.160 
4. The Fourth Circuit 
In Wilson v. Johnson,161 decided in 2008, the Fourth Circuit sided 
with those circuits interpreting Heck’s reach through the lens of the 
Spencer concurrences and dissent.  The opinion appears grounded in 
a policy-based rationale, with the court expressing concern over the 
possibility that strict adherence to Heck would mean that “[i]f a 
prisoner could not, as a practical matter, seek habeas relief, and after 
release, was prevented from filing a § 1983 claim, § 1983’s purpose of 
providing litigants with ‘a uniquely federal remedy’ . . . would be 
severely imperiled.”162  Wilson was to serve six months for grand 
larceny of a motor vehicle.163  Scheduled for release in April of 2006, 
the Virginia Department of Corrections changed the release date to 
July of that same year.164  Wilson filed a grievance with the prison 
administration, but received no response.165  Wilson was released in 
July 2006 and thereafter filed suit seeking monetary damages for 
wrongful imprisonment.166 
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court, which had dismissed 
Wilson’s claim.  The court held that it was the broad reach of § 1983, 
not of Heck, that must be weighed heavily.167  Reasoning that Heck 
did not conclusively answer the question of whether a prisoner who, 
                                                                                                                 
own, equally convinced that because a majority of the Court endorsed it, the 
concurring opinion created an exception to Heck’s favorable-termination 
requirement.  Hence, even though, in the 15 years since Spencer, the Supreme Court 
has never recognized such an exception, we are bound by Powers and, therefore, 
must treat Justice Souter’s ‘holding’ as law.”). 
 158. Powers, 501 F.3d at 602. 
 159. See id. at 603. 
 160. See id. 
 161. 535 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 162. See id. at 262, 268 (quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271–72 (1985) 
(internal citation omitted)). 
 163. Johnson, 535 F.3d at 263. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See id. at 263–64. 
 167. See id. at 266. 
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because of the duration of his incarceration, effectively had no 
remedy in habeas needed to meet the favorable-termination 
requirement, the court rationalized that the Spencer plurality 
provided a rule consistent with the “sweeping breadth, high purposes, 
and uniqueness of § 1983.”168  “Quite simply,” the court concluded, 
“we do not believe that a habeas ineligible former prisoner seeking 
redress for denial of his most precious right—freedom—should be left 
without access to a federal court.”169  Despite this far-reaching 
sentiment, the court stopped short of recognizing a right to an all-
encompassing federal remedy.170 
5. The Tenth Circuit 
In 2010, the Tenth Circuit in Cohen v. Longshore171 confronted 
Heck’s applicability to false imprisonment claims based on allegedly 
unlawful immigration detention.  The court held that “[i]f a petitioner 
is unable to obtain habeas relief—at least where this inability is not 
due to the petitioner’s own lack of diligence—it would be unjust to 
place his claim for relief beyond the scope of § 1983.”172  The Tenth 
Circuit acknowledged the split and analyzed the merits of each side’s 
position.173  The court could not agree with those circuits holding that 
the Heck favorable-termination requirement unequivocally prevents 
§ 1983 claims where a prisoner’s release forecloses a remedy under 
habeas.  Given the Supreme Court’s own admission in Muhammad v. 
Close,174 and the fact that the prisoner in Heck was still incarcerated, 
the court considered this to be an unsettled question of law and was 
not persuaded that Heck must always be applied to petitioners 
                                                                                                                 
 168. See id. at 268 (quotation marks omitted) (alterations omitted). 
 169. See id. 
 170. In its discussion of whether application of the Heck bar would unduly 
frustrate the broad scope of § 1983, the court qualified prisoners as those who “could 
not, as a practical matter, seek habeas relief.” Id.  This suggests that the holding is 
limited to prisoners, like those in Powers and Nonnette, who could not have filed a 
habeas petition because of mootness or the fact that they were never incarcerated. 
See id.  Indeed, the Fourth Circuit has subsequently interpreted Johnson accordingly. 
See, e.g., Campbell v. Beckley Police Dep’t, 390 F. App’x 246, 248 (4th Cir. 2010) 
(“[W]hen a former prisoner is challenging the validity of his past confinement, and 
due to his release ‘would be left without any access to federal court if his § 1983 claim 
was barred[,]’ this court has allowed the former prisoner’s § 1983 claim to proceed.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 171. 621 F.3d 1311 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 172. Id. at 1316–17. 
 173. See id. at 1315–17. 
 174. 540 U.S. 749 (2004); see also supra note 75 and accompanying text (noting that 
it remains unsettled whether Heck’s favorable-termination requirement applies when 
habeas is no longer available). 
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without a habeas remedy.175  The court further held that this approach 
“is both more just and more in accordance with the purpose of 
§ 1983.”176  But, like the Fourth Circuit in Wilson, the Tenth Circuit 
applied a “practicality-based” exception and would only lift Heck’s 
bar where the petitioner, for reasons outside of his own control, could 
not first seek to invalidate the conviction through habeas.177 
6. The Seventh Circuit 
Finally, in Burd v. Sessler,178 the Seventh Circuit addressed whether 
a plaintiff may seek damages against prison officials in their 
individual capacities for the alleged violation of an individual’s right 
to access the courts without satisfying Heck’s favorable-termination 
requirement.  In Burd, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant prison 
officials deprived him of access to the courts by preventing him from 
using the prison library during the thirty-day window in which to file a 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea.179  Burd never sought to set aside 
his conviction through federal or state habeas petitions prior to filing 
his § 1983 suit.180  Burd was released from prison in November 2011, 
with parole scheduled to end one year later.181  The district court 
dismissed Burd’s suit, finding the claim barred by Heck.182 
The Seventh Circuit affirmed.  First, the court held that success on 
Burd’s claim—that he was denied access to the courts by prison 
officials—would necessarily demonstrate that there was merit to his 
claim and that he should have been able to withdraw his plea.183  This 
result placed Burd’s claim squarely in Heck’s scope.  Second, the 
court rejected Burd’s claim that, because he was no longer in custody, 
and therefore ineligible for habeas relief, Heck was inapplicable and 
he should have been permitted to pursue his claim under § 1983.184  
However, the court’s decision was not premised on a broad reading of 
Heck’s bar; rather, Burd’s claim was rejected because he “could have 
                                                                                                                 
 175. Cohen, 621 F.3d at 1316. 
 176. Id. 
 177. See id. at 1317; see also Taylor v. City of Bixby, Okla., No. 12-CV-0066-CVE- 
FHM, 2012 WL 6115051, at *7 (N.D. Ok. Dec. 10, 2012) (“Pursuant to Cohen, 
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 178. 702 F.3d 429 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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sought collateral relief at an earlier time but declined the opportunity 
and waited until collateral relief became unavailable before suing.”185  
Adhering to the concerns of the concurring Justices in Spencer, while 
at the same time refusing to permit an end-run around Heck, the 
court in Burd took the position that only when a § 1983 plaintiff 
ignores the opportunity to seek collateral relief while incarcerated 
will his action be barred by Heck upon release.186 
Although the circuits have split on the issue of whether Heck’s bar 
is absolute regardless of the claimant’s custodial status, those circuits 
following Justice Souter’s approach have limited their holdings, 
finding Heck inapplicable most often when habeas relief is 
unavailable through no fault of the plaintiff.  Indeed, no circuit court 
has read the Spencer concurrences to imply an absolute entitlement 
to a federal remedy at any time for a constitutional violation.  That is, 
of course, until Poventud. 
C. Heck in the Second Circuit 
The Court in Poventud II claimed that “[u]nder the law of this 
Circuit, a plaintiff asserting the unconstitutionality of his conviction 
or incarceration must have access to a federal remedy.”187  In the 
wake of Poventud II’s vacatur, the question of how far the Second 
Circuit took Justice Souter’s proposed Heck exception remains 
unanswered.188  This Section catalogues the application of Heck and 
Spencer in the Second Circuit prior to the Poventud line of cases, 
informing the basis for Part IV’s discussion. 
                                                                                                                 
 185. Id. at 436. 
 186. See id. at 435–36; see also DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 616–17 (7th Cir. 
2000). 
 187. Poventud II, 715 F.3d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 2013), vacated en banc on other grounds, 
750 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 188. Compare Teichmann v. New York, 769 F.3d 821, 827 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(Livingston, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in part) 
(“Referring to this line of cases, Judge Calabresi describes the ‘law in this Circuit’ as 
holding that ‘when a plaintiff does not have access to habeas—at least where the 
plaintiff has not intentionally caused habeas to be unavailable—favorable 
termination of the underlying sentence or conviction is not required.’  While our en 
banc decision in Poventud v. City of New York may not have disturbed certain 
precedents in this area, the Poventud panel decision has been vacated and I 
respectfully disagree with my colleague’s characterization of our still-binding case 
law.” (internal citations omitted)), with id. at 830 (Calabresi, J., concurring) (“I 
believe that the law of our Circuit remains as it was despite our recent en banc 
decision in Poventud.”). 
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1. Jenkins v. Haubert 
The Second Circuit’s first occasion to analyze the dual application 
of Heck and Spencer arose in Jenkins v. Haubert.189  In Jenkins, the 
court confronted the question of whether a § 1983 claim is cognizable 
“where a prisoner (or former prisoner) alleges a constitutional 
violation arising out of the imposition of intra-prison disciplinary 
sanctions that have no effect on the duration of the prisoner’s overall 
confinement.”190 
Jenkins, a prisoner at Green Haven Correctional Facility, was the 
subject of two disciplinary proceedings.191  At the first disciplinary 
hearing on July 26, 1994, defendant Lieutenant Haubert denied 
Jenkins’ request to call four witnesses on his behalf because none of 
the individuals had witnessed the events precipitating the hearing.192  
Haubert sentenced Jenkins to thirty days in “keep-lock.”193  After 
unsuccessfully appealing to the Green Haven superintendent, Jenkins 
filed a New York C.P.L.R. Article 78 claim alleging that Haubert’s 
refusal to let the four witnesses testify amounted to a violation of 
Jenkins’ due process rights.194  On November 23, 1994, Jenkins found 
himself again before Lieutenant Haubert in a second disciplinary 
hearing.195  Jenkins requested that Haubert recuse himself on bias 
grounds, but Haubert denied the request.196  Haubert found Jenkins 
guilty and sentenced him to an additional thirty days in keep-lock.197  
Jenkins’ administrative appeal was denied as meritless.198 
After the New York Supreme Court dismissed his Article 78 claim, 
Jenkins filed suit under § 1983, alleging violations of his Fourteenth 
Amendment right to due process.199  The district court dismissed 
Jenkins’ claim, in relevant part, as barred by Heck’s favorable-
                                                                                                                 
 189. 179 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 190. See id. at 21. 
 191. See id. at 20. 
 192. Jenkins v. Haubert, No. 95 Civ. 5453, 1996 WL 350685, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 
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termination requirement.200  The district court reasoned that the 
Supreme Court’s application of Heck in Edwards v. Balisok201 
foreclosed challenges to intra-prison disciplinary decisions without 
first showing favorable termination, even though the disciplinary 
decision in Edwards affected the duration of the sentence.202 
The Court of Appeals disagreed, recognizing a distinction between 
challenges to the conditions of confinement, including disciplinary 
sanctions such as keep-lock, and challenges to the fact or duration of 
confinement.203  The court held that a § 1983 claimant challenging 
only the conditions of confinement does not need to satisfy Heck’s 
favorable-termination requirement because the challenged 
disciplinary “convictions” were irrelevant to the fact or duration of 
Jenkins’ sentence.204  The court further reasoned that applying Heck’s 
bar in this situation “would contravene the pronouncement of five 
justices that some federal remedy—either habeas corpus or § 1983—
must be available.”205 
2. Leather v. Eyck 
On the same day that Jenkins was issued, the Second Circuit issued 
Leather v. Eyck,206 relying on Jenkins’ implied secondary holding that 
a § 1983 claim is not barred by Heck when a claimant is not in the 
custody of the state and therefore has no remedy under habeas.  John 
Leather brought suit alleging that he was selectively prosecuted in 
retaliation for the lawful exercise of his right to free speech.207  
Leather claimed that members of the Putnam County Sheriff’s 
                                                                                                                 
 200. Jenkins v. Haubert, No. 95 Civ. 5453, 1998 WL 148332, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 
30, 1998). 
 201. 520 U.S. 641 (1997). 
 202. Jenkins, 1998 WL 148332, at *3. 
 203. Jenkins, 179 F.3d at 27.  Balisok concerned a challenge to prison disciplinary 
procedures that affected the loss of good-time credits. Balisok, 520 U.S. at 643.  The 
claimant alleged deceit and bias on the part of a prison official. Id. at 647.  Thus, 
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would imply the invalidity of the imposed punishment. 
 204. Jenkins, 179 F.3d at 27. 
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solely on our tally of votes on the Court for Justice Souter’s view of Heck.” Id.  The 
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the bar only applies if the claim challenges the conviction, and the court found that 
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that a federal remedy must always be available. 
 206. 180 F.3d 420 (2d Cir. 1999) (Calabresi, J.).  I note the author because of Judge 
Calabresi’s central role in the Poventud debate discussed in Part III, infra. 
 207. Leather, 180 F.3d at 422. 
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Department, in retaliation for Leather’s opposition of the 
Department’s control of the county’s E-911 communications center, 
waited for him to leave a restaurant where Leather had been dining 
with his wife for the purpose of affecting an arrest for driving while 
intoxicated.208  Leather was successfully prosecuted on a lesser charge, 
assessed a $300 fine, and had his license suspended for ninety days.209  
Because Leather was never in custody, he never had access to habeas 
as a means of challenging his conviction.  Recognizing that even 
though the facts of Jenkins presented a challenge to conditions of 
prison confinement, and thus did not trigger Heck’s favorable-
termination requirement, the Leather panel nevertheless followed 
Jenkins’ pronouncement that “to apply the Heck rule in such 
circumstances [where habeas is not available] would contravene the 
pronouncement of five justices that some federal remedy . . . must be 
available.”210 
3. Green v. Montgomery 
Months later, the Second Circuit reaffirmed the holding in Leather, 
albeit in dicta in a footnote.  In Green v. Montgomery,211 the court 
certified questions to the New York Court of Appeals to determine 
whether the district court’s grant of summary judgment was proper 
under New York law.212  Defendants, who had won summary 
judgment in the district court on collateral estoppel grounds, argued 
in the alternative that permitting Green’s § 1983 claim to continue 
would run afoul of Heck because a finding that the officers used 
excessive force would imply the invalidity of Green’s conviction for 
reckless endangerment.213  Writing for the panel, Judge Calabresi 
rejected the defendants’ contention, pointing to the holding in 
Leather: “We have held, however, that Heck acts only to bar § 1983 
suits when the plaintiff has a habeas corpus remedy available to him 
(i.e., when he is in state custody).”214  This was not, however, the basis 
for the court’s ultimate holding, which certified questions to the New 
York Court of Appeals because the resolution of the federal 
questions presented in Green’s suit turned on unsettled questions of 
                                                                                                                 
 208. Id. 
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 210. Jenkins, 179 F.3d at 27. 
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state law.215  When the New York Court of Appeals answered, the 
Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants on that basis alone.216 
4. Huang ex rel. Yu v. Johnson 
In Huang ex rel. Yu v. Johnson,217 the court addressed a § 1983 suit 
alleging that New York state correction officers violated plaintiff’s 
son’s constitutional rights by failing to conduct a hearing prior to 
placement in a residential facility and failing to properly credit her 
son’s sentence with time served, resulting in illegal custody for eighty-
three days.218  Analyzing the claim under Heck as a threshold matter, 
the court reviewed the Circuit’s recent holdings in Jenkins, Leather, 
and Sims v. Artuz219 and concluded that this line of cases precluded 
the application of Heck’s bar to a § 1983 challenge where the plaintiff 
was not in custody, even if it indeed challenges the fact or duration of 
the incarceration.220 
III.  POVENTUD V. CITY OF NEW YORK 
A. Background 
In March 1997, two men robbed livery driver Yuonis Duopo at 
gunpoint and shot him, non-fatally, in the head or neck.221  Although 
an initial New York City Police Department (NYPD) Crime Scene 
Unit (CSU) search of the cab revealed only a single shell casing, five 
one-dollar bills, and a black hat, all found in the back seat, NYPD 
Detective Frankie Rosado conducted a second search and uncovered 
a wallet on the floor by the front passenger seat.222  The wallet 
contained two ID cards belonging to Francisco Poventud.223  Armed 
                                                                                                                 
 215. See id. at 60–61. 
 216. Green v. Montgomery, 245 F.3d 142, 143 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (“The 
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with a suspect, NYPD Sergeant Kenneth Umlauft prepared a photo 
array using one of the ID photos and presented it to Duopo.224  
Duopo positively identified Francisco Poventud as the shooter.225  
However, unbeknownst to the NYPD, Francisco Poventud was 
incarcerated at the time of the shooting.226  Thus, police turned to 
Francisco’s brother, Marcos.  Detectives replaced Francisco’s picture 
with Marcos’s and showed the array again to Duopo.227  Upon seeing 
the array a fourth time,228 Duopo positively identified Marcos 
Poventud as his assailant.229  Police arrested Marcos and co-defendant 
Robert Maldonado, both of whom Duopo subsequently identified in 
a lineup.230  Police failed to preserve the original array containing 
Francisco Poventud’s picture and failed to disclose Duopo’s original 
identification to both the Bronx County District Attorney’s Office 
and defense counsel.231 
At trial, Marcos Poventud asserted an alibi defense: he testified 
that on the night of the shooting he was playing video games at a 
neighbor’s house.232  Duopo was the only witness at trial to identify 
Marcos Poventud as the shooter, and it took him four times to do 
so.233  Evidence of his initial identification of Francisco was never 
presented.  The jury convicted both defendants, convicting Poventud 
of second degree attempted murder, first degree attempted robbery, 
first degree assault, and second degree criminal possession of a 
weapon.234  He was later sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of 
ten to twenty years imprisonment.235 
In 2002, Marcos’s alleged accomplice, Maldonado, successfully 
challenged an evidentiary ruling, and the New York Court of Appeals 
overturned his conviction.236  At the same time, however, Poventud’s 
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conviction was affirmed, and leave to appeal was denied.237  Only 
during Maldonado’s retrial did evidence of the suppressed 
identification come to light.238  Maldonado was acquitted and 
Poventud filed a motion pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure 
Law § 440.10 to vacate his conviction on the ground that the 
prosecution, albeit through no fault of their own, withheld evidence in 
violation of Brady v. Maryland239 and People v. Rosario.240  The New 
York Supreme Court, Bronx County, granted the motion in October 
2005, some eight years after his conviction.241 
The prosecution filed a notice of appeal and successfully argued 
that Poventud should be denied bail while awaiting his retrial.242  As 
an alternative disposition, the prosecution offered Poventud 
immediate release if he pled guilty to third degree attempted robbery, 
a non-violent Class-E felony.243  Poventud accepted the plea in 
January 2006, was sentenced to one year, and was immediately 
released.244 
B. Poventud I—The District Court 
On May 22, 2007, Poventud filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York against, inter alia, the City of New York, alleging 
deprivation “of his Due Process and Fair Trial rights under the Fifth, 
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.”245  In June 2011,246 the 
defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that Poventud’s 
constitutional claims were barred by Heck.247  Finding that Poventud’s 
suit was “rooted in due process violations arising from the 
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prosecution’s failure to reveal evidence which [Poventud] alleges 
would have supported his alibi defense” at trial, success on these 
claims would “logically imply the invalidity” of his guilty plea because 
Poventud pled guilty to conduct “which necessarily required his 
presence at the scene of the crime.”248  Put simply, if the suppressed 
misidentification evidence upon which Poventud based his claims 
gave rise to damages, it must imply the invalidity of his guilty plea 
because it is irreconcilable with Poventud being present at the scene 
of the crime.  Because of this inconsistency—denying his presence at 
the scene of the crime at trial but then admitting to it in his plea—the 
district court concluded that Poventud could not succeed on his claim 
because he could not show that “the challenged conviction has been 
reversed, expunged, invalidated, or called into question.”249  The 
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.250 
C. Poventud II—Exception to the Heck Bar Broadly Construed 
Poventud appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment 
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.251  The 
three-judge panel, comprised of then-Chief Judge Dennis Jacobs, 
Judge Guido Calabresi, and Judge Robert Sack, divided over the 
issue of whether Poventud’s release from custody constituted an 
exception to Heck’s bar.  Judge Calabresi, joined by Judge Sack, 
wrote for the majority and held that “[u]nder the law of this Circuit, a 
plaintiff asserting the unconstitutionality of his conviction or 
incarceration must have access to a federal remedy . . . .  As Poventud 
is no longer in custody [and therefore cannot seek habeas relief], 
Heck does not bar his claims under § 1983.”252 
The panel decision explained that the Second Circuit had adopted 
the limited view of Heck preferred by the concurring and dissenting 
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Justices in Spencer.253  The majority held that this circuit had 
consistently reaffirmed the holdings in Jenkins and Leather that 
“Heck’s favorable termination requirement applies only to plaintiffs 
who are in custody.”254  Claimants with no remedy in habeas may 
pursue their claims under § 1983.255  The court viewed Poventud’s 
guilty plea as a possible defense to his claim for damages, but not a 
bar to the action.256  Holding otherwise would have denied Poventud 
any federal forum to seek redress for his alleged constitutional 
violation.  Thus, the court concluded that, because Poventud was no 
longer in custody, the district court incorrectly barred his claim.257 
Chief Judge Jacobs dissented, fervently rejecting both the 
majority’s reliance on Supreme Court dicta and the majority’s 
expansion of what he deemed already flawed post-Heck Second 
Circuit case law.258  Judge Jacobs posited that pre-Heck Second 
Circuit cases barred § 1983 claims that challenged the validity of 
outstanding convictions and the Supreme Court’s holding in Heck 
simply affirmed the Circuit’s position.259  Moreover, he argued that 
the line of cases cited by the majority failed to effect a reversal of this 
Circuit’s precedent.260 
Even if it were appropriate to rely on the concurring and dissenting 
Spencer opinions to limit Heck’s application, Judge Jacobs viewed the 
majority’s holding as incongruous with any tenuous exceptions 
discernible in the Circuit’s post-Heck jurisprudence.261  Jenkins, 
Leather, Green, and Huang were all either distinguishable or 
inapposite, and their holdings fell short of the broad and generalized 
rule adopted by the majority.262  These cases merely expressed 
support for Spencer’s narrow exception; they did not hold it 
                                                                                                                 
 253. See supra Part I.B. 
 254. Poventud II, 715 F.3d at 61. 
 255. See id. 
 256. See id. at 61 n.2. 
 257. Id. at 62. 
 258. Id. at 66 (Jacobs, C.J., dissenting). 
 259. Id. at 67–68, 72.  Judge Jacobs acknowledged Justice Souter’s attempt to 
narrow the majority’s holding in Heck, but countered with the majority’s response, 
which explicitly rejected Souter’s proposed limitation. See id. at 72 (citing Heck v. 
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 490 n.10 (1994)).  Judge Jacobs was critical of the majority’s 
discountenance of this proposition as both a footnote and dicta, because he believed 
the majority relied on nothing more. See id. 
 260. See id. at 67–68 & n.4. 
 261. Id. at 69. 
 262. See id. at 70. 
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absolute.263  Judge Jacobs remained resolute in his belief that Heck’s 
bar remained in full force.264 
With the majority’s holding, the Second Circuit had diverged from 
both sides of the circuit split.265 
D. Poventud III—Vacatur and Narrower Ground 
Following the panel’s opinion, a majority of active judges on the 
Second Circuit voted to rehear the case en banc to determine, inter 
alia, the implications of custody (and access to habeas) as it interacts 
with § 1983 claims that would otherwise imply the invalidity of an 
outstanding conviction.266  In addition to the parties’ briefs, the court 
drew amici from various criminal defense and state prosecutorial 
organizations.267  On September 25, 2013, fifteen judges heard oral 
argument.268  On January 16, 2014, nine judges upheld Poventud’s 
right to sue under § 1983.269  Underscoring the extraordinary facts and 
considerable legal questions presented, there were two concurring 
opinions, one opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, and 
two dissenting opinions.270  Judge Richard C. Wesley, writing for the 
majority, found that Poventud’s § 1983 claim is not barred by Heck 
because it does not necessarily imply the invalidity of his outstanding 
conviction.271  Thus, the Court declined to reach the issue that so 
sharply divided the original panel: whether a plaintiff challenging an 
allegedly unconstitutional conviction or incarceration who is no 
                                                                                                                 
 263. See id. 
 264. Poventud II, 715 F.3d at 70 (“I decline to argue over dicta distilled from 
dicta—especially when the Supreme Court, ten sister Circuits, and numerous cases in 
this Circuit counsel otherwise.”). 
 265. See id.; see also supra Part II.A–B. 
 266. Poventud III, 750 F.3d at 124 (2d Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
 267. See, e.g., Brief for District Attorneys Association of the State of New York as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellees, Poventud III, 750 F.3d 121 (2d 
Cir. 2014) (No. 12-1011-CV), 2013 WL 4038709; Brief for Amici Curiae States of New 
York, Connecticut, and Vermont in Support of Appellees, Poventud III, 750 F.3d 121 
(2d Cir. 2014) (No. 12-1011-CV), 2013 WL 4038710. 
 268. See Mark Hamblett, Full Circuit to Hear Arguments on Ex-Inmate’s Right to 
Sue, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 25, 2013, available at http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/
PubArticleFriendlyNY.jsp?id=1202620673996.  In addition to the thirteen active 
circuit judges, Senior Circuit Judges Calabresi and Sack were eligible to participate in 
the en banc rehearing because they were members of the original three-judge panel. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 46(c)(1) (2012). 
 269. Poventud III, 750 F.3d 121. 
 270. See Id. at 138 (Lynch, J., concurring); id. at 146 (Lohier, J., concurring); id. at 
147 (Chin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 150 (Jacobs, J., 
dissenting); id. at 165 (Livingston, J., dissenting). 
 271. Id. at 127 (majority opinion). 
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longer in custody, and therefore is ineligible for habeas, may pursue a 
claim under § 1983.272 
1. The Majority Opinion 
Although the majority upheld Poventud’s right to sue under § 1983, 
it did so on a substantially narrower ground than the original panel.  
Avoiding the question of whether custody alters a court’s Heck 
analysis, the majority’s decision rested on the conclusion that 
Poventud’s claims do not impugn his extant conviction by guilty 
plea.273  Poventud had successfully challenged his 1998 trial 
conviction.274  His § 1983 claims related only to the improper 
procedures used in obtaining that conviction.275  Thus, concluded the 
majority, Poventud’s subsequent guilty plea is “entirely independent” 
of the alleged deficiencies at issue in his suit.276  Consequently, success 
on those claims would not render invalid Poventud’s separate 2006 
plea.277 
Although the court’s decision vacated the prior panel opinion, it 
did not address the issue that so fiercely divided those judges.  
Indeed, the majority on several occasions reiterated that it declined to 
reach the issue and expressed no views on the prior panel’s analysis or 
conclusion.278  “As we note several times in this opinion,” wrote Judge 
Wesley, “we decide this matter on the narrowest possible grounds 
without passing any judgments on the views previously expressed by 
either the members of the panel majority . . . or by the then lone 
dissenter.”279 
2. Judge Jacobs’ Principal Dissent280 
Judge Jacobs, writing for the dissent,281 argued that because 
Poventud’s guilty plea conclusively placed him at the scene of the 
crime with the intent to commit robbery, an award of damages for 
civil claims that are grounded in Poventud’s professed innocence 
                                                                                                                 
 272. Id. at 125 n.1. 
 273. Id. at 127. 
 274. See id. at 136. 
 275. See id. 
 276. See id. 
 277. See id. 
 278. See id. at 125 n.1, 127 n.7, 138 n.22. 
 279. Id. at 127 n.7. 
 280. Because Judge Livingston’s dissenting opinion focuses primarily on the 
majority’s Brady analysis, this Article focuses on Judge Jacobs’ dissent. 
 281. Judges Cabranes, Raggi, Livingston, and Droney joined Judge Jacobs’ dissent. 
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unquestionably implies the invalidity of that plea and thus plainly 
invokes Heck.282  Finding that Poventud’s claim necessarily implies 
the invalidity of his extant conviction, Judge Jacobs turned to the 
issue that “launched th[e] rehearing en banc: whether the Heck bar 
applies only to persons in custody, as the majority of the three-judge 
panel held; whether there are any exceptions to the Heck bar; and 
whether any exceptions that may exist would save Poventud’s 
claim.”283  Judge Jacobs and his colleagues rejected the bright-line 
custody-based holding of the original panel and argued that even if 
exceptions to Heck do exist, a point the dissent in no way concedes, 
Poventud’s suit does not fall within them.284 
First, Judge Jacobs contended that even if Spencer’s proposed 
exception to Heck was the law, it would not apply here.  Poventud’s 
ability to seek a favorable termination was not “impossible as a 
matter of law.”285  In fact, Poventud had filed a collateral attack in 
state court challenging the voluntariness of his guilty plea, but 
withdrew it prior to an evidentiary hearing.286  Thus, because 
Poventud remained able to refile his motion to vacate the plea, 
compliance was not impossible as a matter of law. 
Second, the dissent addressed the original panel’s interpretation of 
Heck within the Second Circuit.  The dissent perceived an implicit 
rejection in the majority opinion of the original panel’s conclusion, 
despite the majority taking pains to emphasize the en banc panel’s 
neutrality.287  Jacobs contended that the majority’s acknowledgment—
that Poventud’s claims would be barred under DiBlasio v. City of 
New York288 if they sounded in malicious prosecution—is 
incompatible with the original panel’s decision because the Heck rule 
                                                                                                                 
 282. Poventud III, 750 F.3d at 154 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
 283. Id. at 163. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. at 163 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 21 
(1998) (Souter, J., concurring)). 
 286. See id. at 164; see also Poventud I, No. 07 Civ. 3998, 2012 WL 727802, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2012). 
 287. See id. at 165; see also id. at 125 n.1, 127 n.7, 138 n.22. 
 288. 102 F.3d 654 (2d Cir. 1996).  In DiBlasio, the plaintiff successfully secured a 
writ of habeas corpus because of the prosecution’s alleged failure to produce or 
identify a confidential informant. See id. at 655.  On retrial, plaintiff was convicted of 
a lesser offense. See id.  The plaintiff thereafter filed a § 1983 claim alleging, inter 
alia, malicious prosecution. See id.  The district court dismissed the suit and the 
Second Circuit affirmed.  Because the plaintiff’s retrial ended in a conviction, the 
proceedings had not terminated in plaintiff’s favor. See id. at 658.  Accordingly, 
because plaintiff could not show a favorable-termination, he likewise could not prove 
all the elements of a malicious prosecution claim. See id. at 657. 
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was not implicated in DiBlasio.289  Judge Jacobs additionally pointed 
to a footnote in Poventud III, where the majority stressed that success 
on Poventud’s § 1983 claim would do nothing to impeach the validity 
of the 2006 conviction by guilty plea, because this consideration 
“would be obviated but for the [otherwise applicable] bar of Heck.”290  
In other words, the majority acknowledged that Poventud’s freedom 
was irrelevant because, even though he was no longer in custody, the 
majority conceded that Heck would bar claims relating to his 
outstanding 2006 guilty plea.291  If the rule announced in the original 
panel decision were correct, there would be no need to consider that 
possibility. 
Lower courts in the Second Circuit must now grapple with this 
litany of distinctly divided opinions to ascertain how Heck’s favorable 
termination requirement is to be applied going forward. 
IV.  THE POVENTUD II PANEL DECISION INCORRECTLY 
EXPANDED THE LIMITED EXCEPTIONS PREVIOUSLY 
RECOGNIZED BY THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
This Part analyzes prior Second Circuit decisions interpreting the 
limits of Heck and compares the reasoning in those cases with the 
holding in Poventud II.  First, this Part considers whether limiting 
Heck’s bar only to claims brought by persons who are eligible for (or 
were eligible for and failed to diligently pursue) habeas relief is 
appropriate, given Heck’s core concerns.  Next, it argues that the 
holdings in Jenkins, Leather, and Green do not stand for the broad 
proposition that, where habeas relief is unavailable to a former 
prisoner, § 1983 relief must be also.  Further, this Part argues that 
Huang, while expanding on the narrow exceptions recognized in the 
previous cases, nevertheless stopped short of the broader conclusion 
reached in Poventud II, permitting § 1983 suits whenever habeas is 
unavailable.  Next, this Part assesses whether Huang can be 
reconciled with Heck and Spencer, and concludes that it can if 
narrowly construed.  Finally, this Part examines Poventud III to 
determine whether it implicitly rejected Poventud II’s holding and 
argues that although it remains unclear, courts in the Second Circuit 
should read these cases as narrowly as possible, limiting the 
exceptions to the facts presented in conformance with a majority of 
other circuit courts. 
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 291. See id. at 136 n.19. 
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A. These Narrow Interpretations Accord with Heck 
Heck’s core concerns are not frustrated by the narrow exceptions 
recognized in the majority of circuit courts.  As an initial matter, 
neither Heck nor Spencer was required to address whether the 
favorable-termination requirement applies when a § 1983 plaintiff 
cannot challenge an outstanding conviction through a habeas 
petition.292  It is clear from Heck and, indeed, from all circuit courts, 
that when § 1983 and habeas overlap, a prisoner must show a 
favorable termination before a civil suit for damages can lie.293  
However, there is less support for the extension of this principle to 
cases where no such overlap exists. 
Heck’s footnote ten is a source of controversy regarding the 
breadth of Heck’s holding.  Some courts have cited footnote ten to 
support the proposition that Heck’s bar is absolute.294  Others have 
rejected that assertion, determining footnote ten to be nothing more 
than non-binding dicta.295  In footnote ten, Justice Scalia responded 
directly to Justice Souter’s concern that the majority holding would 
leave former prisoners without a remedy once they are released from 
custody, stating, “[w]e think the principle barring collateral attacks—
a longstanding and deeply rooted feature of both the common law 
and our own jurisprudence—is not rendered inapplicable by the 
fortuity that a convicted criminal is no longer incarcerated.”296  
Moreover, Justice Scalia prefaced his response by noting that “no 
real-life example” of Justice Souter’s objections “comes to mind.”297  
Footnote ten highlights two important reasons why the narrow 
exceptions recognized in Part II.B are consonant with Heck’s holding 
and why post-Heck Second Circuit cases can be appropriately 
narrowed to accord with Supreme Court precedent. 
Careful review of the plain text of Heck gives credence to the idea 
that Heck only applies to former prisoners.  Former prisoners, unlike 
those who were never incarcerated, had access to habeas at some 
point.  Barring § 1983 claims by former prisoners eliminates the 
incentive to end-run state habeas exhaustion requirements, a concern 
                                                                                                                 
 292. See supra Part I.B.1–2. 
 293. See supra note 48 and accompanying text; see also supra Part II. 
 294. See, e.g., Entzi v. Redmann, 485 F.3d 998, 1003 (8th Cir. 2007); see also 
Wilson v. Johnson, 535 F.3d 262, 262 (4th Cir. 2008) (Hanson, J., dissenting) (holding 
that footnote ten “is part of the core holding of Heck”). 
 295. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19, 21, 26–27 (2d Cir. 1999); Dolney v. 
Lahammer, 70 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1040–42 & n.1 (D.S.D. 1999). 
 296. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 490 n.10 (1994) (emphasis added). 
 297. See id. 
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expressed by the Court in Heck.298  There is no risk of subversion, 
however, when habeas was never possible.  It is notable that most 
circuits recognizing an exception for former prisoners have required a 
good faith pursuit of habeas when applicable, in order to alleviate this 
concern.299  Moreover, even permitting suits by plaintiffs who were 
never or are no longer incarcerated does nothing to thwart “the hoary 
principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for 
challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments.”300  First, it 
is axiomatic that a claimant who was never incarcerated cannot intend 
to subvert habeas’ exhaustion requirements in order to seek release 
through a § 1983 claim because release was never a concern; the 
claimant seeks only damages.  Second, a claimant who is no longer 
incarcerated cannot seek to use a favorable civil judgment, even if it 
implies the invalidity of an outstanding conviction, as an 
impermissible, roundabout means of achieving release because there 
is no release being sought.301  Roy Heck, however, could have used a 
favorable civil judgment to “bolster a habeas claim for release,”302 and 
the result in Heck flows logically from that fact. 
Furthermore, the circuit split evidences numerous “real-life” 
examples where applying Heck broadly foreclosed any form of 
federal relief for constitutional violations, undercutting the thrust of 
Justice Scalia’s argument.303  Thus, as multiple scholars have argued, 
footnote ten should be recognized as dicta.304  This Article proceeds to 
                                                                                                                 
 298. See Johnson v. Pottawotomie Tribal Police Dep’t, 411 F. App’x 195, 198 (10th 
Cir. 2011) (“The purpose behind Heck is to prevent litigants from using a § 
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habeas actions.” (quotations omitted)); Dyer v. Lee, 488 F.3d 876, 880 (11th Cir. 
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 299. See supra Part II.B. 
 300. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486. 
 301. See Note, Defining the Reach of Heck v. Humphrey: Should the Favorable 
Termination Rule Apply to Individuals who Lack Access to Habeas Corpus?, 121 
HARV. L. REV. 868, 882 (2008). 
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 304. See, e.g., Fein, supra note 71, at 25; Note, supra note 301, at 881–82 (“Given 
that Heck did not require the Court to decide the question of whether an inmate 
ineligible for habeas should be able to pursue a § 1983 claim, it is difficult to conclude 
that Justice Scalia’s argument for the extension of the favorable termination 
requirement to such claims ‘received the full and careful consideration of the 
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examine post-Heck case law in the Second Circuit and proposes 
interpretations accordant with this view. 
B. Jenkins, Leather, and Green Did not Create an Absolute 
Right to File Suit Under Section 1983 
Judge Calabresi’s decision principally relied on the Second 
Circuit’s prior decisions in Jenkins, Leather, and Green to conclude 
that “[o]ur Court has adopted Justice Souter’s dicta in Spencer.”305  
This reliance, however, is unfounded.  None of these cases stand for 
the broad proposition that an ex-prisoner, for whom habeas is no 
longer available, has an absolute right to seek damages under 
§ 1983.306  Moreover, these cases presented facts materially 
distinguishable from those in Poventud, and close examination of 
their holdings reveals that exceptions to Heck’s bar are best confined 
to these limited circumstances rather than universally applied.307 
Jenkins concerned a challenge against intra-prison disciplinary 
sanctions and the process by which those sanctions were 
determined.308  The court permitted the suit to proceed because Heck 
plainly was inapplicable to these facts.  Jenkins’ suit sought damages 
for “using the wrong procedures, not for reaching the wrong result,”309 
a category of claims clearly deemed permissible in Heck.  Indeed, 
Heck only applies if the suit challenges the validity or length of 
confinement, an element wholly missing from Jenkins’s allegations.  
Success on Jenkins’s claims would have done nothing to invalidate the 
conviction placing him in prison in the first place.  Thus, the court 
properly held Heck inapplicable.310  Jenkins is suitably analogized to 
the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Harden because neither suit 
implicated the plaintiff’s underlying guilt or innocence.  They simply 
challenged the extraneous processes by which subsequent treatment 
was decided.311 
                                                                                                                 
[C]ourt.’”). But see Schneidau, supra note 58, at 659 & n.108 (2010) (citing cases that 
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 305. Poventud II, 715 F.3d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 2013), vacated en banc on other grounds, 
750 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2014). 
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 307. See supra Part II.C. 
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and accompanying text. 
 310. See supra notes 202–04 and accompanying text. 
 311. See supra notes 121–22, 202–04 and accompanying text. 
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Moreover, it is of no moment that the court pronounced that, even 
if Jenkins’s suit did in fact impugn his underlying conviction, applying 
Heck’s bar would be counter to the position taken by five current 
Justices.312  The statement may be factually correct, but that alone 
does not give it the force of law.313  First, as discussed in Parts II.A 
and II.B above, it remains unsettled whether the Spencer 
concurrences and dissent succeeded in limiting the sweeping bar of 
Heck.314  Second, the statement in Jenkins was hardly necessary to the 
court’s conclusion that the suit may proceed, a point conceded in the 
opinion, and is thus properly categorized as dicta.315  It is not 
characterized as an alternative holding, but purely a signal of 
agreement with Spencer’s proposed constraint.  Jenkins, therefore, is 
best viewed as a straightforward application of, rather than an 
exception to, Heck.316 
The court’s decision in Leather appears on its face to directly 
support the conclusion reached by Judge Calabresi in Poventud II.  
However, there is a factor in Leather that should properly distinguish 
its holding from the issue presented in Poventud.  The plaintiff in 
Leather was never incarcerated.  This distinction is significant for two 
reasons.  As discussed above, the majority in Heck addressed directly 
Justice Souter’s concern that prisoners no longer in custody would be 
left without a remedy if Heck’s bar were applied so absolutely: “We 
think the principle barring collateral attacks—a longstanding and 
deeply rooted feature of both the common law and our own 
jurisprudence—is not rendered inapplicable by the fortuity that a 
convicted criminal is no longer incarcerated.”317  Interpreted literally, 
this removes the facts of Leather from Heck’s purview under the 
theory that Heck bars claims only by former prisoners.318  Former 
prisoners, unlike those who were never imprisoned, had access to 
habeas at some point. 
                                                                                                                 
 312. See supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
 313. See Note, supra note 301, at 881 (noting that dicta is “‘a statement not 
addressed to the question before the court or necessary for its decision’”) (citing 
Fein, supra note 71, at 13). 
 314. See supra Parts II.A and II.B. 
 315. See supra notes 203–04 and accompanying text. 
 316. Jenkins, like Heck, was in prison, but his claims had nothing to do with the 
conviction that resulted in his incarceration. 
 317. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 490 n.10 (1994) (emphasis added); see also 
supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text. 
 318. Of course, it must be recognized that regardless of whether a person was ever 
incarcerated, the possibility of conflicting judgments concerning the validity of the 
conviction may still arise.  But, as discussed in Part IV.A above, the consequences of 
such conflicting judgments are much more limited. 
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This position is accordant with the holdings of a majority of the 
circuits discussed in Part II.B where the courts barred actions under 
Heck when former prisoners failed to avail themselves of accessible 
remedies while they were incarcerated.319  These courts were not 
opposed to exceptions under Heck, but only acknowledged them 
when the claimant had made a good faith effort to pursue an available 
remedy such as habeas, or when such an opportunity was never 
possible for reasons outside the claimant’s control.320  Suits could 
proceed where the plaintiff never had access to habeas, either because 
they were never incarcerated or the period of incarceration was too 
short for habeas to be practically available.321  Thus, one could 
conclude that Leather supports the proposition that those who never 
had access to habeas, as opposed to those who no longer have access, 
may bring suit under § 1983.322 
Reading Leather this way further limits concerns that it may run 
afoul of Heck’s primary objective: to prevent a prisoner from 
obtaining a civil judgment implying the invalidity of the conviction for 
which he is currently incarcerated.323  True, conflicting judgments may 
arise, but it is entirely possible to avoid a scenario where a prisoner 
remains incarcerated despite a court judgment finding his conviction 
illegal.324  This restrained conception of Leather is reconcilable with 
those circuits that have found exceptions to Heck without creating an 
easy means of vitiating Heck’s core concerns.325  Thus, Leather is 
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 320. See supra Part II.B. 
 321. See supra Part II.B. 
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 324. See supra notes 298–300 and accompanying text. 
 325. See supra Part II.B. 
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properly read to permit a § 1983 suit when the claimant was never in 
custody. 
Finally, Green is a tale of two decisions.326  In the first, the panel 
certified questions to the New York Court of Appeals to determine if 
collateral estoppel was appropriate under state law.327  Although the 
district court had granted summary judgment against Green on that 
basis, the defendants had alternatively argued on appeal that Green’s 
claims were barred under Heck.328  In a footnote in that first opinion, 
Judge Calabresi addressed that alternative contention, stating that 
Leather permits § 1983 suits when the plaintiff cannot seek relief 
through habeas.329  The panel stayed their final decision, pending the 
response from the state court.  The New York Court of Appeals 
responded that collateral estoppel was applicable under New York 
law, and the second opinion affirmed the district court’s judgment 
solely on that basis.330  Like the statement in Jenkins, this statement 
was wholly divorced from the court’s actual ruling.331  Remove it from 
the court’s opinion and the outcome remains the same.  There is no 
doubt that these judges expressed a preference for this expansive 
position, but neither Jenkins nor Leather nor Green rested on that 
holding. 
Accordingly, while all three cases express support for the holding 
ultimately reached in Poventud II, not one of them materially relies 
on that premise to reach its conclusion.332  Given the questionable 
support for the original panel’s determination in the Heck and 
Spencer decisions as well as those circuits finding exceptions, these 
Second Circuit cases should not be read to stand for this expansive 
proposition, but rather as recognizing limited exceptions particular to 
the factual scenarios presented in each. 
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C. Even Though Huang Expands Upon the Limited Exceptions 
in Jenkins, Leather, and Green, it Does not Permit Section 1983 
Suits Whenever Habeas Relief Is Unavailable 
Although this Article argues that the decision in Poventud II is 
unsupported by the holdings in Jenkins, Leather, and Green, it 
nevertheless concedes that Huang represents an undeniable 
expansion of those limited holdings.  Huang permitted a § 1983 suit to 
proceed even though it clearly challenged the duration of 
incarceration.333  Yet the court drew a distinction, recognizing that the 
suit only challenged the duration and did not attack the validity of the 
conviction.334  This perhaps intimates that if the suit were to challenge 
the validity of the conviction, even though Huang’s son was no longer 
incarcerated, Heck may have barred the suit.335  To borrow from 
Judge Jacobs’ dissent, this distinction “would be obviated but for the 
bar of Heck.”336  This caveat gives teeth to the idea that, despite the 
court’s acknowledgment that five Justices in Spencer supported an 
absolute right to a federal remedy, the Second Circuit was unwilling 
to explicitly go that far absent a clearer indication from the Supreme 
Court. 
Indeed, some lower courts have construed Huang’s holding to be 
more limited than it may appear on its face.  In Browdy v. Karpe,337 
the District Court for the District of Connecticut interpreted Huang 
as permitting § 1983 suits so long as they only challenged the duration 
and not the validity of an outstanding conviction.338  Thus, Huang’s 
exception to Heck applied only in certain circumstances where habeas 
was unavailable to address a constitutional wrong, unless the claims 
by their nature attacked the validity of the conviction.339  Finding that 
Browdy’s claim directly implicated the validity of his conviction, the 
district court concluded that Huang was inapposite.340  If Huang stood 
for an absolute remedy under § 1983, the claim could not have been 
                                                                                                                 
 333. See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
 334. See Huang ex rel. Yu v. Johnson, 251 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 335. See id. 
 336. See supra notes 285, 287–88 and accompanying text. 
 337. No. 3:00 CV 1866, 2004 WL 2203464 (D. Conn. Sept. 20, 2004) (Droney, D.J.), 
aff’d, 131 F. App’x 751 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Finally, even if [plaintiff] could clear these 
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74.)). 
 338. See Browdy, 2004 WL 2203464, at *6. 
 339. See id. 
 340. See id. at *8. 
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dismissed on that basis.  It is true that Browdy brought his § 1983 suit 
while still incarcerated and with a state habeas petition pending, but 
these points further highlight why Huang’s holding must be read 
narrowly.  If courts permit post-custodial § 1983 suits to proceed 
because habeas is no longer available, yet deny those same suits if 
brought while the prisoner is still incarcerated, it would create the 
perverse incentive to circumvent habeas’ strict state exhaustion 
requirements by waiting until one’s prison term expires.  This 
untoward result conflicts with the Supreme Court’s rationale in 
Heck.341  Nevertheless, other district courts in the Second Circuit have 
applied a bright-line custody analysis to determine whether Heck bars 
a particular action.342 
Huang’s holding is an outlier among the six other circuit courts that 
recognize some limited exception to Heck’s bar.  At first glance, the 
case closest to Huang is Wilson, in the Fourth Circuit.343  Though not 
explicit, the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning appears to imply a “good 
faith” or “practicality” requirement similar to the Sixth, Seventh, 
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits.344  The Court’s pronouncement that “[i]f a 
prisoner could not, as a practical matter, seek habeas relief, and after 
release, was prevented from filing a § 1983 claim,” suggests that the 
exception is only warranted if some outside force, such as time, is the 
reason that the conviction remains outstanding.345  And, indeed, the 
Fourth Circuit more recently has limited Wilson’s holding to apply 
only to situations where the § 1983 claimant was either never 
                                                                                                                 
 341. See Jones, supra note 58, at 166 (“The Supreme Court’s rationale in Heck was 
relatively straightforward: it would be improper for a prisoner to use a civil damages 
action to circumvent the habeas statute’s strict requirements.”). 
 342. See, e.g., Hardy v. Fischer, 701 F. Supp. 2d 614, 620 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“The 
Court recognizes that Heck’s favorable termination requirement does not bar 
plaintiffs who are not in custody—and thus have no remedy through habeas relief—
from seeking relief pursuant to section 1983.”); Dallas v. Goldberg, No. 95 Civ. 9076, 
2002 WL 1013291, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2002). 
 343. See supra Part II.B.4. 
 344. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
 345. See supra note 170 and accompanying text; see also Bishop v. Cnty. of Macon, 
484 F. App’x 753, 755 (4th Cir. 2012) (“Wilson does not permit a plaintiff to end-run 
Heck by simply sitting on his rights until all avenues for challenging a conviction have 
closed.”); Gilchrist v. Pinson, No. 5:11-01746, 2013 WL 3946278, at *5–6 (D.S.C. July 
31, 2013) (“To hold that Wilson exempts Plaintiff from Heck’s holding would run 
counter to the Fourth Circuit’s warning that Heck cannot be circumvented by a 
plaintiff who fails to take advantage of all available rights.  Thus, even though 
Plaintiff is no longer a prisoner, the court finds that § 1983 suit, with respect to 
Defendants’ actions in May 2009, is barred by Heck.” (citation omitted)). 
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incarcerated or was incarcerated, but for a time insufficient to seek 
habeas relief.346 
Huang can and should be read to imply the same practicality 
requirement.  Yu, the juvenile son whose incarceration was at issue, 
had roughly four months during which to challenge the extension of 
his incarceration from late December 1997 to April 1998.347  This is an 
equivalent time period to that in Wilson.348  Despite the court’s 
reliance on the holding in Leather,349 as discussed above, Leather does 
not support this broad proposition.350  The plaintiff in Leather was 
fined, rather than incarcerated, making habeas an impossibility.351  
The same can be said about Yu’s period of incarceration, which was 
too short a time period to make habeas a practical option.  Although 
the court’s opinion posits a broad, sweeping rule, its incongruity with 
all other circuit courts should lead the lower courts to discern a 
narrower holding and look to the impossibility or impracticability of 
habeas relief, rather than a simple, but more expansive, custody 
versus no custody determination. 
In light of the foregoing, Poventud II’s characterization of these 
cases seems misleading and, in any event, resulted in an unwarranted 
expansion of case law that should be limited to their facts.  Jenkins 
and Green were ultimately decided on other grounds.352  Leather was 
not a “former prisoner,” thus materially distinguishing his claim from 
those analyzed in Heck and Spencer.353  Huang, read broadly, is an 
outlier among all circuit courts and can only accord with the more 
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liberal interpretations of Heck and Spencer if restricted to its 
“practicability of habeas” requirement.  Lower courts should read 
these cases narrowly, addressing the threshold Heck question only 
when directly applicable, and should hold suits as barred unless the 
plaintiff was either never in custody or was not in custody long 
enough to make habeas a viable option. 
D. Lower Courts Should Apply the Second Circuit’s Heck 
Precedent Narrowly Going Forward 
In Poventud III, the en banc Second Circuit vacated Poventud II 
and allowed Marcos Poventud’s suit to proceed because his claim did 
not imply the invalidity of his later (and still extant) guilty plea, not 
because the court recognized an unrestricted right to a federal 
remedy.354  With Poventud II’s holding vacated, either procedurally by 
rehearing en banc or simply because the court reached its decision on 
a narrower ground, the question remains whether such a broad right 
exists within the Second Circuit.355  In other words, were an analogous 
situation to present itself, can courts in the Second Circuit rely on 
Poventud II’s rationale to permit a § 1983 claim that necessarily 
implies the invalidity of an outstanding conviction if habeas is no 
longer available?356  This Section argues that language in the majority 
opinion cannot be deemed an explicit rejection of the result reached 
in Poventud II, but advises lower courts that a narrow reading and 
application of the Circuit’s prior Heck precedent is compatible with 
Heck, Spencer, and the majority of circuit courts. 
Judge Jacobs’s dissent in Poventud III submits that the majority 
implicitly rejected Poventud II’s analysis and therefore holds that 
Heck’s bar is not defeated simply by a prisoner’s release from 
custody.357  First, Judge Jacobs protests that the majority’s concession 
that Poventud’s claims would be barred under DiBlasio v. City of 
                                                                                                                 
 354. See supra notes 264–77 and accompanying text. 
 355. Compare, e.g., Teichmann, 769 F.3d at 827 (Livingston, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment in part) (“I respectfully disagree with [Judge 
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 357. Poventud III, 750 F.3d at 163 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
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New York358 if sounding in malicious prosecution cannot be 
reconciled with the original Poventud II panel’s holding.359  But, as the 
majority in Poventud III notes, favorable-termination is an element of 
the tort of malicious prosecution.360  Thus, a suit alleging malicious 
prosecution cannot succeed without a favorable termination of the 
underlying conviction.361  The plaintiff’s custodial status never comes 
into play unless a favorable termination is first shown.  Therefore, the 
majority’s statement can properly be characterized as a recognition 
that failure as a matter of law to prove an element of an alleged 
offense would bar Poventud’s suit, not as a rejection of the original 
panel’s analysis.362 
Nevertheless, Judge Jacobs cites the footnote wherein the majority 
reiterates that it finds no reason to conclude that success on 
Poventud’s claim would impugn his 2006 guilty plea conviction.363  
Jacobs does so because, even though Poventud is now released, the 
majority there is expressing concern about whether the claim would 
impugn the 2006 conviction, a concern, Jacobs notes, “that would be 
obviated but for the bar of Heck.”364 
This point is well-taken, but hardly conclusive.  As an initial 
matter, even if the court were to hint that it was rejecting the 
Poventud II analysis, such language would be dicta.  The court’s 
decision clearly rests on the finding that Poventud’s suit alleged a 
procedurally-focused Brady claim that was independent from his later 
guilty plea.365  In any event, the majority’s purposeful circumscription 
of Poventud’s claims is not a definitive acknowledgment that Heck’s 
bar remains in force.  It may be because the court was trying to signal 
that custody is not the critical concern in a Heck analysis.  It may be 
because a claim by Poventud regarding the 2006 conviction would 
have sounded in malicious prosecution, the elements of which cannot 
be met with the 2006 conviction remaining unchallenged.  What does 
seem clear, however, is that a majority of the active judges on the 
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Second Circuit are unwilling to extend Heck precedent to the extent 
Judges Calabresi and Sack did in Poventud II.366 
In the last analysis, district courts should read the Second Circuit’s 
Heck precedent as conforming with that of the Fourth, Sixth, 
Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, where claims are permitted if the 
plaintiff was never incarcerated or incarcerated for a period of time so 
short as to render a habeas petition unavailable.  The en banc vacatur 
has given the Circuit, and the lower courts for that matter, an 
opportunity to refine previously flawed case law and adopt a standard 
more in line with a majority of other circuit courts.  Jenkins, Leather, 
Green, and Huang can all be read in a limited fashion that heeds the 
concerns expressed by Justice Souter in his Heck and Spencer 
concurrences while remaining within the bounds of Heck’s majority 
holding. 
CONCLUSION 
Dicta in the Supreme Court’s decisions in Heck v. Humphrey and 
Spencer v. Kemna has created a division amongst the circuit courts of 
appeals as to whether Heck’s favorable-termination requirement 
applies to non-habeas-eligible plaintiffs.  Given the numerosity of 
§ 1983 claims and habeas petitions filed each year,367 the stakes in this 
area of the law are high.  At present, the majority of circuits have 
recognized limited exceptions where the plaintiff was either never in 
custody or was in custody for such a brief period of time that any 
attempt at habeas relief would have been futile.  Until the Second 
Circuit’s decision in Poventud II, no circuit had held Heck 
inapplicable solely by virtue of the plaintiff’s custodial status. 
This Article argues that the Second Circuit’s basis for reaching this 
conclusion was premised on the erroneous reading of post-Heck 
Second Circuit case law, but that these cases can be read in 
accordance with Heck’s core concerns.  This approach is consistent 
with the “hoary principle”368 that § 1983 claims are inappropriate 
substitutes for claims traditionally reserved for habeas, yet respectful 
of Justice Souter’s concern that some would be without a federal 
remedy for constitutional violations.  Going forward, therefore, courts 
in the Second Circuit should abandon Poventud II’s analysis and 
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forgo application of Heck’s favorable-termination requirement when 
the unavailability of habeas cannot be attributed to the plaintiff.  
